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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW'

CLIFFORD C. ALLOWAY0
IrNTRODUCTION

The juridical activity in recent Florida constitutional law is startling
-for the Supreme Court of Florida decided several hundred cases, in the
past two years, involving our state constitution. There are, perhaps, several
factors which explain this total: (1) The Florida Constitution is quite
long,2 very diversified in subject 3 and poorly written; 4 (2) our constitution
is definitely antiquated; and (3) the Florida Supreme Court, dedicated
to reviewing practices which died in the United States Supreme Court
many years ago, attempts a grandiose judicial activity.
The language added to the constitution by amendment was not
significant during this period;6 recent growth in our constitutional law
must, then, be found in those few hundred decisions-which decisions were
the result of unplanned controversies, conclusions of scattered judges and
lay juries, generally vague and ambiguous constitutional language and
the personalities of the justices on our State Supreme Court. The
organization of this paper is not particularly unique-the decisions easily,
however, fitted into the plan utilized.
SEPARATION OF POWERS

The body of the classic separation of powers tradition is still warm
in Florida. 7 This is an interesting example of the static qualities of
Florida Constitutional law. It is difficult to imagine a state supreme
court, in 1952, placing language8 in a decision that "under our form
of government-the Executive, the Legislative and the judicial-no one
of them have the right to invade the sphere of operation of
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*Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Volumes 49 through 66, Southern Reporter, second series.
This article is
merely a survey.
2. The 6000 (approximately) words in the United States Constitution loom
small in comparison.
3. Subjects run from the clerk of the criminal court of record to, of all things,
the qualifications for sureties upon state bonds.
4. Read the beautiful language (comparatively) in the much earlier Federal
Constitution.

5. Florida before 1900 was extraordinarily different, in a social and economic
sense, from 1954 Florida.
6. Fix. CONST. Art. I1l, § 16 and FLA. CONST. Art. VII, § 5 were amended
in 1950, FLA. CONST. Art. V. § 16a; FiA. CONST. Art. V, § 50 (48) (juvenile courts);
FLA. CONST. Art. V, § 51 (48) were adopted in 1950. FA. COxST. Art. XII,
§ 18 (aid to school system) was adopted in 1952. See the 1953 Florida
Legislative Service for indication of some of the constitutional legislative activity
in the last session,
7. If the separation ever did exist it was in a setting which was not modern.

See, generally, Dodd, Administrative Agencies as Legislators and Judges, 25 A.B.A.J.
923 (1939).

8.White v.Johnson, 59 So.2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1952).
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other." This assumes of course that only legislatures "make" the law,
courts "interpret" the law and only executives "execute" the law. With
a mountain of legal writings in the twentieth century maintaining that
judges "make" an appreciable portion of our law, that executives have
to "interpret" to enforce the law and "make" law by enforcement policies,
and that administrative agencies the world over handle, with equal ease,
all the traditional governmental powers, it is discouraging to find that
the issue has not quietly been laid to rest in Florida.
This section will be divided, as are the Florida cases, into the traditional
functional fields.
I. Judicial Power
Judicial question.--Declaratory decrees present the major problem. The
judicial power only extends to judicial questions. What is a judicial question?
In Ervin v. Taylor,9 law enforcement officers who were not permitted a
law practice petitioned for a declaration of their rights. The petition
named no defendants. The attorney general and states attorney filed
answers. The Florida Supreme Court held that real "adversaries" were
necessary or there would be no "actual controversy." These, then, seem
necessary to a judicial question. Mr. Justice Terrell, dissenting,' 0 pointed
out that many cases were permitted which were not adversary, such as a
bond validation; that, since "definite issues" were raised here between able
law firms with the assistance of the attorney general and states attorney,
the petition should have been allowed. The decision would seem to
foreclose much chance for suit by state employees who want to test possibly
invalid laws before acting under them at their peril." The factor of
unnamed defendants seemed to be important. Ervin v. North Miami"
disallowed a similar petition. This decision called for "concrete legal
issues" to create a "justiciable controversy." The judiciary could not give
"free legal advice." This language presently means nothing-it is too vague;
with time we may assume that decisions will dcfine this area.
Who has an adequate interest to raise a constitutional question, in a
declaratory decree petition, is a problem which infiltrates into when a
question is justiciable. In a way they are inseparable. Ervin v. Taylor
may mean that law enforcement officers do not have sufficient interest
under the law sought to be invalidated to be in court. Perhaps there
9, 66 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1953).
10, Id. at 817, 818.
11. The officer can be sued for injury to a citizen, whether he acts, or not,
under an invalid law if he guesses wrong on the state court's action.
12. 66 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1935). But cf. Overman v. State Board of Control,
62 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1952) (all groups here in doubt as to meaning of a law pernitting
expenditures of public funds).
13, 62 So.2d 696, 698 (Fla. 1952); accord, Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Tenn
Grand jury, 56 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1952).
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is a valid distinction. In Overman v. State Board of Control3 the court
held that the declaratory decree was properly invoked where "one's rights,
immunities, status or privileges are . . . in doubt or are obscured." This
language simply is not definite. Used car dealers who opened for business
on Sunday in contravention of a state law were held to have sufficient
interest to test the law's validity-petitioners having alleged they were
"threatened with arrest."' 4 The existence of another possible remedy
did not seem to affect the interest of a petitioner in testing one law by
declaratory decree.13
A taxpayer was permitted to test the validity of a spending law
because of the possibility of "increasing the burden of his taxes." 16 This
is unfortunate. The federal rule 7 has permitted the overworked Federal
Supreme Court to avoid these cases for years. A theatre owner was found
not to have sufficient "standing" to test a tax laid on the theatre patron.18
Failure to raise a constitutional question at the trial court level was
held to affect the sufficiency of the interest one has in a constitutional
case.19 The court recognized the danger of "gratuitous rulings" by the
judiciary. The judicial power does not apparently extend to such a
situation.
Another related field here is when is it possible to raise constitutional
questions. This is important since the more liberal the court is the
more reviewing power the court has, in fact. At least where private
property20 was affected the court permitted the invalidation of public
expenditures even though the public contract involved was "tentative."'2'
"threatened injury" was sufficient.
In zoning cases it generally was held necessary to exhaust the
administrative remedies before attempting to invalidate an ordinance where2
the attack was limited to the ordinance's effect on plaintiff's property3
Also, one's interest to raise constitutional issues was seriously jeopardized
by inaction-the time element involved being uncertain. 23 Is this a
bastard estoppel?
14. Henderson v. Antonacei, 62 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1952); cf. Florida State Board
of Architecture v. Seymour, 62 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1952) (charges filed, but no hearing had).
15. Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term Grand Jury. 56 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1952).
16. Lewis v. Peters, 66 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1953). But cf. Bryan v. Miami, 56
So.2d 924 (Fla. 1951).
17. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
18. ParamounbGulf Theatres v. Pensacola, 62 So.2d 431, 434 (Fla. 1951) (on
re-hearing).
19. Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So.2d 5, 7 (Fla. 1952); accord, Lightfoot v.
State, 64 So.2d 261 (Fla. 1952) (on rehearing court decided validity question properly
in issue).
20. The court has not been so swift in enforcement of the Federal equal protection
clause, U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
21. Lewis v. Peters, 66 So.2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1953); cf. Miami Beach v. Perell,
52 So.2d 906 (la. 1951).
22. De Carlo v. West Miami, 49 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1950).
23. Greene v. Alexander Film Co., 65 So.2d 53 (F'la. 1953); accord, Chastaii v.
Mayo, 56 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1952) (possible waiver); Roche v. Hollywood, 55 So.2d 909
(Fla. 1952) (possible estoppel). See note 18 supra.
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A rather interesting statement in a concurring opinion by Justice
Terrel -4 relates the weight in a precedent sense, given an advisory opinion
to the governor. Advisory opinions then, even when constitutionally
inspired, do not present a full judicial question.25
Generally.-Study of judicial power in the United States is fascinating.'-"

There have been periods in our legal history when our judiciary has
expanded greatly its office, at times overshadowing the supposedly "equal"
executive and legislature. The courts have ravaged legislation from behind
a wall of judicial supremacy. There are some vestiges of that judicial
pedestal in our Florida legal scene. The area is multifaceted, running
from who has a justiciable interest to political and judicial questions,
judicial restraint, judicial attitudes toward law-making, and the general
question of judicial power against a background of expanding legislative
power. The possible expansion or contraction in any is inevitably felt in all.
The Supreme Court has not taken a definite stand on restraint
as a law-maker. In Miami v. Bethel27 the court had a splendid opportunity
to depart from the doctrine of municipal immunity for torts, committed
by employees engaged in a governmental function. The court determined
that law-making is for the legislature. The court restricted, in one
case, 28 changing the common law to issues where the "rules of the common
law are in doubt" or "not within the established precedents." The court
concluded that changes were possible to reflect present day needs only
when applying "general principles," whatever that means. Yet in Bower
v. Bower2" a rule was fashioned simply from the constitutional language
that every person "shall have . . . justice."

Conscious law making by

judges is not frowned upon by the scholars. :0
Related herewith is the relationship between the judicial
legislative powers.

Both cannot remain at a legal high-tide mark.

and
In

several cases the court appropriately weakened its review powers over
24. Petition of Kilgore, 65 So.2d 30, 31 (Fla. 1953).
25. See also, United States Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 55 So.2d 741
(Fa. 1951).
26. See, generally, POUND, TIll- I'ORMATIVE EK.A OF A ,.CAN LAW (1938).
27. 65 So.2d 34 (Fla, 1953).
28. Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420, 422-423 (Fla. 1952).
29. 55 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1951 ) (FLA. CONST'. 1 c.. O RGHrs, § 4).

30. See note 26 supra. IFLA. CoNS'r. DIc.'.cL o, Ricij'rs, § 4 (1951), provides that
"all courts in this state shall be open, so that every person for any injury done him in
his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy, . . . and right and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial or delay," What power does this grant to
the Florida judiciary? See, generally, Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hospital, 65 So.2d 40
(Fla. 1953) (suggestion that this language requires that complaints not e "overthrown
by technical impediments"); Bower v. Bower, 55 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1951) (language used
to obtain a just result under a law); cf. llettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n International,
52 So.2d 676 (fla. 1951); Woods v. City of Palatka, 63 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1953)
(invalidation of city charter provision leaving a plaintiff without remedy for a sidewalk
hole injury); Williams v. City of Green Cove Springs, 65 So.2d 56, 58-61 (Fla. 1953)

(Justice lobson, dissenting, suggested the constitutional words be used to obtain a
iust result under a statute). But cf. Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34, 35-38 (l"la. 1953)
(justice Hobson, concurring specially).
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legislative action. In Moore v. Draper,"' the court validated an exercise
of the legislative police power, with reference to health, stating that "the
exercise of the police power is a matter resting in the discretion of the
Legislature . . . the courts will not interfere . .
except where the
regulations . . . are . . . unreasonable." The case means little since

from the common law the subject of health has been grandly regulated
and the case language is limited to health. The court did.P2 place a
presumption in favor of the legislative action. In another case"" the
court validated a legislative authorization to spend for recreational facilities.
Here, too, the test was whether the legislative power extention was
"reasonable." The court made the somewhat naive statement that, on
the question of review on reasonableness, "all the will the courts have
is freed from personal, political or economic bias." If a court were able
to free itself of these factors in reviewing legislation under a test of
"reasonable" the court would approach the objectivity of God .34 Where
the subject matter was more controversial than public health the
legislative police power did not fare so well. State v. North Miami 5 was
a case wherein the court invalidated (under a vague test of "public
purpose") expenditures of public funds to assist private enterprise. The
antipathy of the court for the legislatively authorized activity was
apparent.36 Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Benn Greene, Inc.a7 held that
even when the legislature makes a legislative finding of fact in a law,
the court will severely review the police power action. Apparently the
situation was the same with or without a finding.38 Judicial review is
generally thought to be sharply limited with such findings.3 9
Court review of administrative action should be somewhat similar to
that of legislative action since both are legislatively authorized and must
depend, finally, upon the legislative power. The court recently very
wisely stopped the circuit courts from substituting their judgment for
that of zoning boards, on the theory that otherwise the courts would
"eventually become the zoning boards." 40 Why have administrative
experts, otherwise? An excellent decision, which increased judicial power,
31. 57 So.2d 648, 649 (Fla. 1952). On this subject, generally, see Paulsen,
The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 Mimi. L. RF.v. 91 (1950).
32. Id. at 650.
33. State v. Jacksonville, 53 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 191).
34. Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L.J.
550 (19'18).
35 L9 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
36. Id. at 785.
37. 54 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
38. Court held such findings were "presumptively correct," id. at 236. Tis is the
situation without a finding, I would suppose.
39. See Beckles, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HA-v. L. REv. 6 (1924). See the Substantive
Due Process materials.
40. Miami Beach v. Hogan, 63 So.2d 493, 495 (Fla. 1953). "Tis weakened the
Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., 45 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1950), approach; accord, Segal v.
Miami, 63 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1953).
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was Carnegie v. Department of Public Safety41 wherein the circuit court
was ordered to make a finding of fact, independent of the agency; here
the administrative hearing onl suspension of a license was ex arte. The
court long has becn confused as to whether to follow the widely adhered
to principle that administrative action backed by "substantial evidence"
2
carries with it a presumption of correctnessi
The court rather obviously found that a circuit judge should not
amend the residence for divorce period 45 and that the power to regulate
or review suspensions, removals or reinstatements of officers by the governor
was not in the judiciary but the governor and the senate.44 The court
broadened administrative power by refusing to interfere with the
administrative procedures used to obtain a rate4 5 Placing a defendant on
parole was found to be "strictly a function of the executive branch."' ,
The "inherent" power of the judiciary was stated to be the "power
to do anything that is reasonably necessary to administer justice within
the scope of the court's jurisdiction." More particularly, this power had
to do with "incidents of litigation, control of . . . process and procedure,
. . . conduct of the officers, and the preservation of order . . . with
reference to its proceedngs." 47
Of course, each of the three great
departments has an implied power area. The problem simply does not
48
arise often.

How broad is the Florida judicial power?

Certainly it is that the

41. 60 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1952). The dissent in Town of Crescent City v. Green,
59 So.2d 1, 2-7 (FIa. 1952), perhaps would set administrative law back to the Civil War.
Theic was suggested no correctness presunptii for an agency finding. 'Ilic
recent
Thronhill v. Kirkmani 62 So.2d 740 (lla. 1953), showed almost complete judicial
reliance upon the agency finding; Carnegie v. Department of Public Safety. 60 So.2d
728 (Pla. 1952) (disregard of administrative finding).
42. Parsons. The Substantial Evidence Rule in Florida Administrative Law,
6 FLA. L. REv. 481 (1953). See, generally, SwENsoN, FEDERAL ADMINiSTRATIVE LAw
(1952), for an excellent survey on tie relationship between judicial power and
administrative power in the Federal system, with its up-to-date procedures.
43. Pepper v. Pepper, 66 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1953); cf. Petition of Florida Bar, 61
So.2d 616 (Fla. 1952).
44. State v. Sullivan, 52 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1951).
45. Jacksonville Gas Corp. v. Florida It. R. & Public Utilities Commission, 50
So.2d 887 (Fla. 1951).
46. Marsh v.Garwood, 65 So.2d 15, 21 (Fla. 1953) (case details constitutional
powers of the Parole Commission).
47. Petition of Florida Bar, 61 So.2d 646, 647 (Fla. 1952).
48. The Florida Constitution has, if anything, too naily specifically mentioned
constitutionally dctermined judicial iurisdictions. 'hc court in Conner v. State Road
Department of Florida, 66 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1953) (condemnation) construed FLA.
CoNsT. ART. V, § 11; accord, Peeler v. Duval County, 66 So.2d 247 (Fla. 1953); and
National Juice Corp. v. Gilligan, 63 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1953). FLA. CONST. Art. V, § 22,
was dealt with in State v. Ferguson, 58 So.2d 1it (Fla 1952) (invalidation tinder
vague constitutional language of small claims court authorization). In Johnson v. Ilayes,
52 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1951), the court dealt with the jurisdiction of a county judge
to set aside dower under FLA. CONST. Art. V, § 17. Fl-k. CoNsT. Art. V, § I received
attention in State v. Burnes, 56 So.2d 506 (Fla. 1951), and Hanson v. State, 56 So.2d
129 (Fla. 1952). The decision of In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 58 So.2d
319 (Fla. 1952), was similar to State v. Ferguson, sgura, in that the jurisdictional amount
of the court had importance in determining duties of the judge inother courts. See
also, McQueen v. Forsythe, 55 So.2d 545 (la. 1951).
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federal judicial power-with expanded executive and legislative functions,
development of the so-called political question and effective judicial
self-restraint-is less. A federal court would be unlikely, in 1952, to use
a quotation to the effect that the court enforces the "spirit as well as
the letter" of the constitution. 4" Splendid is the court which can
objectively determine the "spirit" of a constitution."
II.Legislative Power
The court recently stated that "under our State Constitution it is
not necessary that the constitution contain specific grants of power to the
Legislature; that the Constitution is a limitation upon power rather than
a grant of power. For example, had there been absolutely nothing in
the Constitution .. .the Legislature would have been all-powerful." Then
the court nullified this grant of power to the legislature by adopting
Cooley's famous doctrine of implied constitutional restrictions.P1 The
federal courts develop implied powers and the Florida courts develop implied
limitations. In Brooks v. Pan American Loan Co., 2 the court stated that
"greater power is vested in the judiciary" than in the legislature, an
interesting constitutional thesis.
Delgation of legislative power.-Delcgation validity is generally included
with separation of powers problems since the concept of unconstitutionality
here depends on a true separation. Dclegation of legislative power as an
argument is pass6 in the federal systeums' and is not strong in Florida.
The court recently stated that the "commission may make rules and
regulations within the yardstick" furnished by the legislature. However,
54
the agency could not adopt anl unlikely construction of the "yardstick."
Another issue was whether a legislative standard could be ambulatory.
The court answered in the negative. The legislative words were "accredited
school .. .of pharmacy holding membership in the American Association
of Colleges of Pharmacy." The act was saved by making it static as of
its enactment. The decision also prohibited delegations of power to
private citizens." A standard that the board "shall . . .examine under
such rules . .. as such board may prescribe" was held definite enough
49. Thomas v. State, 58 So.2d 171, 178 (Ila. 1952).

50. See note 34 mpra.
51. See note 49 stpra.
52. 65 So.2d 481, 482 (Fla. 1953) (in the case a legislative direction that
legislative member attorneys, during the SCSsiOn, could have cases continued was validated
as not an "invasion" of judicial power).
53. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (possibly a war power case)
gave it a death blow; all that case required was that the Congress lay out an area for
the agency to work in. The legislative standards can be quite indefinite, permitting
the agency to experiment on the particular socially troubled subject matter.
54. Diamond Cab Owners Ass'n v. Florida Railroad & Public Utilities Commission,
66 So.2d 593, 596 (Fla. 1953).
55. Attwood v. State, 53 So.2d 825, 827 (Fla. 1951).
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in Levine v. Hamilton"" on the theory that the expert pharmacists on

the board could work out the necessary subjects to test applicants better
than the legislature; an excellent decision giving full weight to the
administrative expertise.
These standards obviously cannot be too
narrowly drawn and still be enforceable. Agencies need some discretionary
area within which to experiment.
A statement in Paramount-Gulf Theatres v. Pensacola5" that "The
Legislature cannot abdicate the power to a city" is strange 8 as large
grants of power to cities were well known at common law. In Gough

v. State"9 the court restricted a canvassing board with legislative authority
to "judge the election and returns" to mathematics rather than judging

the validity of returns, indicating the legislature could not grant judicial
power. Separation of powers was said to demand this. Why? Administrative boards everywhere handle such judicial functions through delegated

legislative power.60
III. Executive Power
There was very little activity here. 1 Agencies were required to remain
within the legislative authority delegated to them, in several cases,
since otherwise the agencies would "modify" a legislative act. 2 Also it
was held that only the judiciary may order probation 3 and that the
beverage director, under the separation of powers principle, could not
determine the constitutionality of ordinances. This was held a judicial
question. 4 The court did broaden administrative power by demonstrating
restraint wien petitioned to invalidate agency rules before the agency
Insistence that
had commenced any proceedings under the rules." '
56. 66 So2d 266, 267 (Fla. 1953); accord. Simmons v. Hanton, 65 So.2d 42
(Fla. 1953).
57. 62 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1951) (on rehearing a legislative ratification of the city's
action was found).
58. Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 66 N.E. 607 (1903).
59. 55 So.2d Ill (Fla. 1951).
60. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: I and 11, 47 COL, L. REV.
359 (1947).
61. See, generally, Thomas v. State, 58 So.2d 173 (Hla. 1952), and Ilanchey v.
State, 52 So.2d 429 (Fla. 1951). '1he appointive powers of the governor were dealt
with in the following cases: In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 63 So.2d 321
(Fla. 1953) (invalidated law by-passing election by people, or appointment by the
Governor, of officer); cf. State v. Squarcia, 66 So.2d 263 (HFa. 1953) (judge of civil
court of record); Palm Beach v. West Palm Beach, 55 So.2d 566 (Fa. 1951). Removal
powers: In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, supra; In re Advisory Opinion to the
Governor, 52 So.2d 646 (Fla. 1951) (member of Gaine and Fresh Water Fish
Commission); State v. Sullivan, 52 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1951) (sheriff). The Court detailed
the Governor's general powers to remove, suspend and reinstate).
62. See note 54 supra; accord, l.ec v. Delmar, 66 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1953); Jones
v. Kind, 61 So.2d 188, 191 (Fla, 1952) (a fairly close case. The standard was "rules
. . . for the control . . . of all applicants . . . and for the conducting . . . of all
race tracks . . . ."); Carnegie v. Department of Public Safety, 60 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1952);
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Mack, 57 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1952).
63. Marsh v. Garwood, 65 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1953).
64. Dade County v. Overstreet, 59 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1952).
65. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Carter, 66 So.2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1953).
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administrative remedies be initially exhausted broadens administrative
power by properly rcflecting the agency's expertness on the "reasonableness"
of the rule of regulation.
IV. Conclusion
The separation of powcrs doctrine in Florida dcpends for its strength
upon the quantitative restraint the Florida Supreme Court exercises in
maintaining its judicial power. The power to review legislative and administrative action can become a frankenstein of judicial power. 6 Substantive
due process, procedural due process and separation of powers are but
tools, in a final sense, with which the court employs the judicial power
to, at times, drastically limit action by the perhaps more representative
5
governmental departments."
SUBSTANTIVE

DUE PROCESS-TIlE POLICE POWER 8

The denial to government to take or regulate life or property is a
concern of substantive due process-the disagreement is not over the
procedure to take, it is over the validity of the very taking. 0 The Supreme
Court of Florida apparently does not distinguish between substantive due
process and the state police power 7 -probably the court views the substantive
due process as directly related to the constitutionally valid breadth of the
police power. 7 ' At least in theory 7 the state constitution acts as a
limitation on the generally broad state police power and the limitation
is to be strictly construed.
The federal government, on the other hand, is theoretically one of
constitutionally delegated powers; which powers are to be strictly
construed. In fact, 78 the course of state and federal constitutional law
has been very different. The federal powers have been immensely
broadened by a Supreme Court which, until only recently, cooperated
74
with state supreme courts in drastically limiting the state police power.
66. See note 26 supra.
67. Examine the procedural and substantive due process sections with this thought

in mind.

A plea for state constitutional law which emphasizes the theoretically large

grant of power to the legislature, in the state constitution, instead of that emphasizing

the theoretically small restriction therein can be found in Saye, The Exent of State
Legislative Power, 12 GA. B. J. 147 (1949). judicial "interference" in the government

process probably is not the best solution to legislative excesses, Paulsen, The Persistence

of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MirN. L. REv. 91 (1950).
68. For an exccllent recent Survey of American due priocess of law, see \Voon,

Dun PRocEss oF LAW, 1932-1949 (1951).

69. The writer realizes that these concepts are not clearly distinguishable in fact,
but believes this terminology is useful because of overwhclming pragmatic usage.

70. Carvin v. Baker, 59 So.2d 360, 364 (Fla. 1952).
71. At least this writer ]topes so. A modern outlook would view the police

rather than private
power as limited by only a few basic constitutional limitationsproperty as an unlimited concern except for a few valid police power regulations. Life
in Florida is no longer agrarian simplicity.
YALE

72. Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law, 29
L. J. 137 (1919).
73. Ibid.

74. See, generally, Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L. J. 454 (1909).
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This severe constitutional corset placed on state governmental power
may well explain the heavy pressure on the federal government to do
activities once thought of as local in nature. 5
It is convenient to break down the general state police power into
the various subject matters which seem, in Florida, to have the police
power thrown around them&.
I. Regulation of Businesses Affected With a Public Interest
The Florida Supreme Court, unfortunately, is wedded to terminology
which has generally lost its effectiveness elsewhere. The traditional view
was that the police power was only broad enough to regulate a "business
affected with a public interest." The modern industrial state and its
attendant problems have cracked this concept-a valiant protector of private
contract and private property. 7 The present Florida Supreme Court is
dedicated, theoretically, to a weakened power to review (which mirrors
judicial power, generally) the state police power by establishment of an
equally strengthened presumption of correctness of legislative exercise of
the police power. 8 If this presumption of correctness means anything
then the terminology "public interest" carries with it all businesses and a
heavy burden has to be carried by him who would show otherwise.
Regulation by the state of the liquor industry recently was again
found constitutionally possible 7 -cven to the extent of a waiver of a
constitutionally guaranteed privilege-through an operating license, an
agreement in advance to searches without warrant. The large police power
over gambling enterprises conceivably can be exercised in an "arbitrary
manner." The effect of one regulation was to establish a gambling
monopoly in a large county.8 0 These validations were obvious affairs
75. Witness the demolishment of the old local area sacred from the Federal
interstate commerce powers, E.g., United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n
322 U.S. 533 (1944). The Florida police power and the federal power were in slight
recent conflict. Stewart v. Mack, 66 So.2d 811 (Fla. 1953), sustained the Florida
police power over Florida highways where interstate commerce was not unreasonably
burdened. But cf. lettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 52 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1951). In
Tampa Bay Garden Apartments v. Gay, 55 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1951), the court permitted
taxation of housing rentals when the land involved had been conveyed by the state
to the federal government, The injury to that government was found to be nil. The
recent congressional activities in the field perhaps has strengthened the decision in
Carnasion v. Paul, 53 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1951). The problem was whether United States
v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (19q7) denied to the state a concurrent power to tax
over the areas the California case affected. Henderson v. State, 65 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1953),
invalidated the Florida Public Utility Arbitration Law because Congress had preempted
the regulatory field of peaceful strikes in industries in interstate conmuerce. This
decision was in line with recent Supreme Court of the United States law.
76. 'The Florida Supreme Court seems to so distinguish.
Other states have
trouble here, also; McKinnon, Due Process of Law and Economic Legislation-North
Carolina Style, I 1)oIKi 1.J, 51 (1951).
77. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930).
78. E.g., Smith v. Ervin, 64 So.2d 166, 169 (Fla. 1953).
79. Boyton %,.State, 64 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1953); cf. Ragozzino v. Town of Lake
Maitland, 54 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1951). See Pickerill v. Schott, 55 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1951).
80. Rodriguez v. Jones, 64 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1953); cf. Simmons v. ltanton,
65 So.2d 42 (Fla. 1953).
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since the common law contains such a long tradition of regulation of
liquor and gambling. Feller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.8 1 held that
the insurance business was similarly "affected with a public interest."
In that case the legislative power over insurance was found such that the
court applied a Florida law permitting a judgment for attorney's fees
82
to an insurance contract made outside of Florida. In Lee v. Pelmar
another approach was used. There an agency attempted to regulate part-time
real estate salesmen out of existence. The court admitted that the
legislature had determined realty sales to be "clothed with the public
interest." In opposition the court placed "the right to work
and acquire and possess property" as being more important. It would
seem that there must be a connection between the public interest and
every regulation of a business so affected, which should prove uniquely
agonizing to the administrative agency. The presumption of correctness
somehow got lost in this case.
Competition of private parking facilities with a city operated parking
project did not invalidate the city endeavor. A public interest was found
in such an enterprise. 3 The Florida police power, generally, over property
84
would appear not too strong.
II. Zoning85
The modern approach, 6 to zoning and planning demonstrates a judicial
awareness that large cities necessitate planned growth. The whole subject
is treated by the courts as expert ill nature. Courts are not such expcrts.
This requires a strong zoning board presumption of correctness. The
Florida Supreme Court decisions were not consistent. Miami Shores Village
v. Bessemer Properties7 indicated a lack of judicial awareness of these
fundamentals. Therein the court simply determined the unreasonableness
8 demonstrated
of the village zoning plan and invalidated. Cooper v. Sinclair"
the more functional judicial attitude. The burden was placed on the
erring citizen to show the unreasonableness of requiring house trailers to
locate in designated areas. The general police power to zone and plan
was referred to. Then the zoning ordinance survived.
The occasional conflict between private property and a zoning agency
over the possible enforced use of the eminent domain procedure was
81. 57 So.2d 581 (Via. 19S2).
82. 66 So.2d 252, 25 (Fla. 1953) (since the court found the commission did
not have legislative authority anyway, the case was weakened).
83. Gate City Garage v. Jacksonville, 66 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1953).
84. State v. Towu of North Miami, 59 So.2d 779, 787 (Fia. 1952) (court
depended on terms to determine if legislative exercise valid). I his tendency of somc
of the state courts has been noted elsewhere; Note, State Views on Economic Due
Process, 53 Coi.. L. Rrv. 6 (1953).
85. One could argue over the inclusion of zoniing powers.
86. E.g., Comment, Municipal Zoning Law in Connecticut, 35 CoNN. B.). 162
(1951).
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resolved in the 1952 case, Miami v. Romer. 9 An owner of property
fronting on a street claimed that a city ordinance, requiring no building
closer than 25 feet to the center of the street, was invalid because the
city should have condemned his property and compensated him. The
presumption was correctly used and the attack failed.
Zoning power follows the general police power, of which it can be
considered a part, in that if the zoning ordinance is not proven "unreasonable" it is validated. 0
III. Spending and Disposing9 '
The court apparently permitted the state authority to subsidize the
first medical school established in Florida, even though that school be a
privately endowed institution.9 2 The employment of a financial advisor,
by a city, to assist in a bond refunding program was validated.93 A
county's expenditure to purchase land, construct buildings thereon and
lease the project to a private corporation was viewed kindly by the
court.94 City expenditures on possibly a very grandiose scale to develop
recreational facilities-perhaps to the extent of constructing an entire
resort-were validated. 5 In these latter cases there appeared to be a
strong presumption that the attempted expenditure was reasonable.
There were recent cases, however, limiting sharply this police power
area. 90 In State v. North Miami,17 the powers to spend and of
eminent domain were, in effect, equated, but neither was held sufficient
to authorize expenditures to purchase land, construct an aluminum plant
thereon and thereafter to rent the project to a private industry. Spending
for a "public utility" or a "public service" would be proper. The old
police power regulation terminology raises its ugly head again.
The case of Adam v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach9 employed
the most disturbing rejection of an adequate police power. The court
suggested that the spending power could be used to acquire land and
87. 54 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1951); accord, Miami Beach v. Perell, 52 So.2d 906
(Fla. 88.
1951)4 So.2d 702 (Fia. 1953); cf. Garvin v. Baker, 59 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1952);

Glackmau v. Miami Beach, 51 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1951).
89. 58 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1952) (facts in these cases change the result so easily
that precedent value here is weak).
90. Garvin v. Baker, 59 So.2d 360, 361 (Fla. 1952).
91. The writer has attempted to distinguish letween the spending and borrowing
powers. At times the court makes this distinction.
92. Overman v. State Board of Control, 62 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1952).
93. City of Avon Park v. Sullivan, Nelson & Goss, 50 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1951).

94. State v. Dade County, 62 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1953).

95. State v. Escambia County, 52 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1951); ef. State v. Jacksonville,
53 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1951).
96. This is unlike tie Federal situation; Corwin, Spending Power of Congress,
36 lIARV. L. RFv. 548 (1923).
97. 59 So.2d 779, 787 (Fla. 1952). Lewis v. Peters, 66 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1953),
was similar. There the city was disallowed to acquire land to turn over to private

interests to develop low-remnt housing for service people.

98. 60 So.2d 663, 665 (Fla. 1952).
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erect low cost housing thereon if the project were government operated
and limited to lessees in the "low income tax brackets." However, the
purchase by the housing authority of property, which the owners had
permittcd to decline into slumns, was invalidated because the authority
planned to sell the property to private individuals and corporations to
develop into a commercial area under new zoning plans. Apparently
the court determined the scheme as unreasonable because of the effect
on the slum owners. This solicitation is not even admirable, and is still
misplaced. The court indicated that the North Miami case limited
expenditures for a public purpose. The possibility the city might "profit"
perhaps made this project a non-public purpose. It is even difficult to
justify the opinion as a support of "private enterprise" since the effect
was to insist the city government operate the project, when completed.
The cases indicate, strangely, that expenditures are valid for "play,"
but not to enable a local government to build for the future.99
IV. Borrowing and Pledging' 00
The general governmental situation, constitutionally speaking, with
borrowing is dealt with in another part of this article. Two cases did
indicate an interesting limitation on the power to borrow. The court,
in Gate City Garage v. Jacksonville/ 0 ' stated that it was permissible
to service bonds from parking meter revenues only if the project being
financed had some close relationship to parking meters. Building parking
facilities would have that contact while constructing streets would not.
The distinction is puzzling. A similar decision disallowed servicing a
bond issue to construct port facilities from parking meter revenues."' ' The
court also held that a government unit may pledge the revenues from
state property, to secure a debt, but may not pledge the property
itself . o3
V. Taxation'0 4
As well as this writer can determine, in the case of Panama City v.
State,"" ' the court restricted the use of the tax power in aid of the
more gencral police power (of which it is, I would assume, a part)
so that "unjustified profits" could not be made. This is interesting.
Involved was the use of parking meter revenues to service bonds to
construct streets. Tle court referred to the "inherent right" of "ordinary
99. See also, Hollywood v. Broward County, 54 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1951).
100. See, generally, Patterson, Legal Aspects of Florida Municipal Bond Financing,
6

FLA.

L.

REV.

287, 311-313 (95)

101. 66 So.2d 653, 056 (Il. 1953).
102. Chase v. City of Sanford, 54 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1951).
103. State v, Florida State liaprovernett Commission, 60 So.2d 747, 75-4 (Fla. 1952).
104. ltere, too, one might argue against inclusion under the police power. The
Federal tax power is practically unlimited, e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301

U.S. 548 1937).
105. 0 So.1d 658 (Fla. 1952).
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use of the streets." It would seem that there is an ordinary right to
smoke cigarettes, also, or to do, or use, any number of activities, or
things, taxed. It was stated that the tax power and the less specific
police power, when united, must be for the "welfare of the people." No
one could argue with that generality.
There was other recent decisions. The power of the legislature to
0
establish special taxing districts for "public purposes" was validated.10'
A "gross abuse of legislative authority" would be struck down. The
property'owners in the district created must, of course, be benefited. A
legislative finding of benefits was of assistance unless "devoid of any
reasonable basis."' 07
l s
VI. Eminent Domain
The most important decision in this section was Adams v. Housing
Authority of Daytona Beach, 0 9 which has already been dealt with under
the spending power. There the legislature authorized the city, by purchase
and eminent domain, to acquire a "blighted area," plan a development
for the area, re-zone it under that plan and sell or lease the project to
private enterprise for general commercial usage. The decision is quite
confused. The court distinguished between the police and eminent
domain power-the former to be exercised without compensation (the
power to regulate property "to promote the health, morals and safety"what happened to the general welfare?), the latter requiring compensation.
Assuming this to be true why are not the powers usable in aid of
each other? The police power alone should be used, according to the
court, to abate such an area's filthy slums. The eminent domain power
was restricted to a "public use" which the court found not present. Yet
the court also limited the spending power of government equally in the
case. 1" 0 So government, forced with a cancerous area in its midst, cali
apparently abate that ailment by condemnation as a nuisance (as
unhealthy) or condemnation under eminent domain which leaves the
land to be developed again by the same owners who originally permitted
it to disintegrate, The crux seems to be the redevelopment by private
enterprise which, under the vague terminology "public use," led the court
to invalidate as a disturbance to "private enterprise."' The court, in a

106. State v,Anna Maria Island Erosion Prevention District, 58 So.2d 845, 846
(Fla. 1952).
107. State v. Warren, 57 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1951); accord, Rosche v. Hollywood,
55 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1952). The factor of taxation for a valid purpose was exemplified
by Pan Beach v. Vest Pali Beach, 55 So.2d 566 (Fla. 1951). See Patterson,
Legal Aspects of Florida Municipal Bond Financing, 6 F1LA. L. Rzv. 287, 311-313
(1953
See, also, Chase v. Board of Public Instruction, 52 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1951).
108. The great power might well be considered separately from the general police
power.

The convenience in not so doing rests upon

the fact that substantive and

procedural due process reach into both, and the eminent domain action is generally
in aid of some facet of the general welfare.

109. 60 So.2d 663, 666, 668 (Fla. 1952).
110. See note 98 supra.
111. See note 109 supra, at page 669.
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later case,' 12 suggested that much the same result could be accomplished
if private enterprise were permitted to utilize the fruits of eminent domain
in a small way. On reading this case one is not certain whether the general
police power, the spending power, or the eminent domain power-or all
three-are the basis for decision.113 The spending and eminent domain
4
powers have been equated by the court."
VII. The Police Power, Generally"
Health.-The police power exercise in connection with health was
validated where a statute authorized confinement of individuals affected
with a contagious disease."" A heavy presumption in favor of the law
crushed a religious freedom argument. Vhere private property or contract
rather than a "civil right" was concerned the court came to a quite
different conclusion."' The court's language was reminiscent of that
in the famous Lochner v. New York case."18 An ordinance required barbershops to close after 7:00 P.M. The particular barbershop catered to an
evening trade. The court held the ordinance was "not shown" to have
any relation to the health of the barber or public. Mr. Justice Peckham,
in the Lochner case, when he similarly reversed the presumption of legislative
correctness, said about the same with bakers. The court even admitted
the "relation" of the barber to the public interest; insult after injury it
would appear.
The case of Gustafson v. Ocala"' was more attractive on its facts,

for there the presumption referred to above was fairly overcome. The
health of an area was referred to in invalidating a prohibition of pasteurized
milk sales therein where the milk was pasteurized elsewhere. The milk
industry involved adequately demonstrated the lack of basis, in health,
for the ordinance. The court correctly utilized the presumption.
Safety.-There have recently been several traffic meter revenue cases,
under the police power as related to safety. In the Panama City v. State' - '
case the police power, with reference to traffic control, was not held
sufficiently strong to permit construction of streets financed by a bond
112. Gate City Garage v. Jacksonville, 66 So2d 653, 656 (Fla. 1953).
113. See Note, 54 A.L.R. 7 (1928), for a collection of these public use eminent
domain cases. See Redevelopment Agency of City and City of San Francisco v. Hayes,

22 U.S.L. Week 2390 (U.S. Jan. 29, 1954).
114. State v. Town of North Miami,

59 So.ld 779, 785

(Fla. 1952).

See,

generally, Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Luw of Eminent Domain, 20

$.U.L. REV. 615 (1940); Note, 7 Go. WASH. L. REv. 520 (1939).
115. This breakdown

seents to mirror the distinctions of the Court.

This is

disturbing, for if the Court followed its own professed limitations on judicial review,
such emphasis on subject to validate a police power exercise would not be necessary.
See notes 71, 72, and 73 supra and the text related thereto.
116. Moore v. Draper, 57 So.Zd 648 (Fla. 1952),
117. Miansi v. Shell's Super Store, 50 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1951).
118. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
One could alnost close one's eyes and be back in 1905.
119. 53 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1951).

120. 60 So.2d 658, 659 (Fla. 1952); accord, Gate City Garage v.Jacksonville, 66
So.2d 453 (Fla. 1953).
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issue serviced from parking meter revenues. The court's strange reasoning
ran this way: Streets are for movement of traffic and secondarily for
parking. Meters are placed on streets "as a consequence of the existence
of said streets." The police power cannot get the "cart before the
horse." Why? The court worried that control of traffic is "too remote"
from street construction. Mr. Justice Terrell's dissent suggested that the
court had ignored the principle that the legislature is the "judge of its
scope" on police power imatters.' 2' Why the construction and improvement
of streets is unrelated escapes this writer. A similarly handled decision
was Loftin v. Miami.122 A safety ordinance was passed which limited
the speed of trains within the city and required trains to come to a
complete stop at crossings, unless certain safety devices were installed.
The court found that the plaintiff's trains were involved in only a few
accidents in 1950. The court found the "expense" would be great for
the plaintiff to conform to the ordinance. This "expense" was made
a factor in detennining the "reasonableness" of the ordinance. The
ordinance was invalidated.
Property "rights" apparently received a somewhat stronger resistance
to the police power exercise than "civil rights," where safety was concerned.
The state through a court injunction1 23 was permitted to crush a picket
line, in connection with a labor dispute, even though the picketing was
peaceful and no evidence connected the union with violence. The police
power, in connection with safety, was not dwarfed here.
Morals.-In Pickerell v. Schott,1'24 the court upheld a severe regulation
of the relationship between liquor retailers and the rest of the liquor
industry. Normal credit arrangements were almost abrogated. That these
restrictions might promote "temperance" assisted the court's rationale.
121. Id. at 660-662.
122. 53 So.2d 654, 656 (Fla. 1951).
123. Miami Typographical Union No. 430 v. Orincrod. 61 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1952).
How this restriction of free-speech can be justified, when the union was not connected
to the violence, is difficult to explain.

lPolice Power and Labor's "Civil Rights"

For convenience

to readers here are

collected several of

the more important

decisions in the police power vs. labor's "civil rights" area. This is, of course, generally
a part of freedom of speech. (The federal and state decisions indicate that this area
is not free speech, asYsuch.)
Miami Typographical Union Nco. 430 v. Ormerod. supra,
held that pickleting for an unlawful ptriose (to force emploer to coerce einployces
to join union) was not protected as part of free speech. The violcnce in the case
was not related to the union or the picket line area. The picket signs language

was directed more toward "scabbing" by the still employed employees. I lotel &
Restaurants Employees & Bartenders Union v. Cothron, 59 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1952), held
that picketing an employer who fired union employees was constitutionally (the Florida

cases generally fail to distinguish between the State and Federal Constitutions) protected.
Carpenters' Dist. Council v. Miami Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of
America, 55 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1951), held that an injunction may be utilized in Florida
to rather drastically interfere in
contract with an employer group.

intCr-onion affairs where the union is breaking a
The Florida ConstitutiOnal language on closed shop

arrangements was implemented in Local No. 234 v. Henley & 13eckwith, 66 So.Zd 88
(Fla. 1953).
124. 55 So.2d 716 (17a. 151).
125. State v. Ucciferri, 61 So.2d 374, 375 (Fla. 1952).
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Tie court also upheld a limitation on reporting race track information. 125
Severe restriction of activities "injurious to the public morals" was held
possible.
Cenerally.-'ie Florida Supreme Court held that legislative power
is inadequate to extend a restriction, in a private contract, after the normal
l 26
expiration.
'
A prohibition on construction, to eliminate noise, was held
2
invalid
as being beyond tle police power scope. 2 It appeared that the
court set up a presumption againsi the reasonableness of the ordinance.
Thus, the court refused to uphold a Miami ordinance designed to stop
the heavy inconvenience to motorists from train crossing delays.' 2 9 This
inconvenience, it would seem, simply was beyond the reach of the police
power. The citizens were told to "adjust themselves" to it, and any
possible presumptions were in favor of the railroads. In Chase v.
Sanford,'
the court indicated that the city could not contract in a
bond issue, to keep parking meters fixed for a long period of time. This
was a reasonable decision since the police power in connection with
safety has been traditionally sacred from such irrevocable arrangements.
At issue again was the Florida fair trade agreements law.' 3' The legislature
had added a "finding of fact" that the law was a lawful exercise of police
power and would not create monopolies. The law was again crippled.
The fact findings by the legislature were brushed aside since the findings
were conclusions, not "facts." The court took judicial notice of "contrary
132
. . . truths." These acts do seem to have trouble in the courts.
The power of the legislature over elections and politics was referred
to by the court to sustain the 1951 election code, under which contributions
to candidacies for political office in the state have to be made in a certain
manner. 33 Of course these laws are easily determined necessary in times
of enormous political expenditures. '3 4 'The suit concerned a radio station
and a newspaper. Obviously involved were freedom of press and speech.
An extremely strong presumption was pronounced in favor of the legislative
restriction. In view of the court's weak stand where private property is
concerned the validity of the statement "beyond all reasonable doubt that,
under any rational view . . ." seems doubtful.

The court also validated

as a "municipal function" a city's operation of a radio-television station.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

5

Griffin v. Sharp, 65 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1953).
Town of Bay Harbor Island v. SchIlakik, 57 So.2d 855, 857 (Fla. 1952).
This writer is not sure-the case is confused.
Loftin v. Miami, 53 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1951). See note 122 supra.
54 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1951).
Seagram-l)istillers Corp. v. Ben Creen, 54 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
The power to determine minimum prices seems to be in trouble, Note,
I U.S.L. Rev. 100 (1953).
133. Smith v. Ervin, 64 So.2d 166, 168, 169 (Fla. 1953) and Ervin v. Finley,
66 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1953).

134. See, generally, Comment, 41

CALIF.

L.

REV.

300 (1953).

135. State v. Jacksonville, 50 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1951).
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Agency determination of value basis for rate-fixing was tolerated in a 1951
case wherein the rate had an "end result" of reasonableness." 36 The
police power over civil service employees sustained a civil service rule
regulating an employee's activities off of the job. 17 The power of the
legislature to authorize inclusion of lands in a municipality was at issue
in two cases."" Only lands that were so "wild," "unoccupied" and
"unimproved" that inclusion would result in no benefits thereto could
resist the legislative power. Presumption of correctness was in favor of
the legislature.
VIII. Conclusion
The state police power is not presently at the strength one would
expect in a modern non-agrarian state. The Florida Supreme Court's
distaste for analysis is probably one reason therefor-from the cases it
is impossible to determine if there is one general police power or a
number of powers tenuously related to some vague general police power.
The court's uneasy use of the legislative presumption of correctness adds
to the haze. Why also should government power be broader in regulation
of the human "rights" area, as opposed to the property "rights" area? 39
Since a valid police power exertion, in the last analysis, must not be
"unreasonable" and since that test almost dircctly will mirror the justices'
personal tastes and distastes, it is not "unreasonable" to state that incorrect
usage of presumptions in the police power field results in a vast increase
in judicial power.140
136. Jacksonville Gas Corp. v. Florida R.R. & Public Utilities Commission, 50
So.2d 887, 892 (Fla. 1951). This is something of a procedural due process concern.
137. Johnson v. Tradcr, 52 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1951).
138. Gillette v. Tampa, 57 So.2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1952) and State v. lollandale,
52 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1951) (presumption not involved inicase. Lands were excluded).
139. For convenience to readers here are collected several of the more important
(none are world-shaking) decisions in the police power vs. constitutional "civil rights"
field. Religious freedom: lenderson v. Antonacci. 62 So.2d 5. 8 (Fla. 1952), indicated
that laws closing businesses on Sunday are valid only under the police power as related
to health. The police power mist not he based upoL "any religious principle". The
Court made the rather naive statement that the Federal and State Constitutions
require "the complete separation of church and stale". Fenske v. Coddington,
57 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1952), validated the location of a private chapel in a public
school building. In view of McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (194),
the decision is questionable. Moore v. Draper, 57 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1952), crushed a
religious freedom argument by validating a police power confinement of a diseased
individual. See the excellent article, Steinhardt, Religious Freedom and State Control,
6 MIAr.Mi L.Q. 385 (1952). Speech and press freedoms: Ervin v. Finlay, 64 So.2d 175
(Fla. 1953), and Smith v. Ervin, 64 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1953, validated slight regulation
of radio broadcasting and newspaper publishing with reference to expenditures and
assistance in furtherance of political candidates. Under a strong legislative presumption
of correctness the law as held reasonable-police power over elections was invoked.
The state police power over morals validated, in State v. Oceiferri, 61 So.2d 374
(Fla. 1952), a law regulating the flow of race track information. Cf. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State. 53 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1951).
140. See note 74 supra. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 53 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1951).
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PRocuRA DUE PRocEss
14
I. Administrative Due Process
The inter-action between substantive (police power) due process and
procedural due process is quite interesting. The cases illustrate that the
state police power breadth definitely relates to the strength of procedural
due process.

42

In 1953, the court held143 that a law providing for "the automatic
suspension of a beverage license, without notice and hearing, but after
some communication facility has been removed from the premises by a
law having for its purpose the elimination of . . . gambling" did not violate
procedural due process conceptions. The state power over the liquor
business was referred to to sustain the agency action under the law. The
decision needs that reference. A similar liquor regulation case'" validated
the omission of an agency hearing, on the issue of constitutionality of the
agency's action, where an independent suit for that purpose was possible.
The state power over the highways was insufficient, strangely, to justify a
summary disposal of a truck by state officers (no hearing) to satisfy a
fixed penalty for overloading. The court indicated 14 that such procedure
would be valid where no factual issues could arise. When would this
be possible? The accuracy of the truck scales, being open to question,
invalidated the summary procedure. The court cited the famous Lawton
case' 46 but refused to follow that approach. The director of the department
of public safety was permitted' 4 ' to suspend a driver's license without notice
or hearing because the holder had a "privilege" rather than a "right."
Obviously, the real basis for the decision was the extent of the state
police power over highways and traffic problems. Similar to these cases
was Chastain v. Mayo 48 which held that conditional pardon holders can
be rearrested and recommitted by the board of pardons without generally
followed administrative due process procedures. The police power reference
here was simple to locate. Happily, civil service employee severance
demanded notice and hearing.' 4" The federal cases make similar
demands. 50
1i1. See, generally,
MIAMI

L. Q. 281 (1952).

Stone,

An

Introduction to the Administrative Process, 6

142. See, generally, McKinnon, Due Process of Law" and Economic Legislation-

North Carolina Style, I l)uK]n. L.J. 51 (19S]).
143. Holloway v. Schott, 64 So.2d 680 (1953)

(the decision was strengthened 1y

the fact that a hearing had been had before another agency before the con tillicatins
were pulled out).

144. Pickerill v. Shott, 55 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1951). This is nfortunate. Agency
expertise is helpful to courts, even on the question of validity of agency action-this
is particularly true when the reasonableness of the agency action is tested.
145. Youngblood v. Darby, 58 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1951).
146. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (perhaps the value of the property
made a difference).

147.
148.
149.
150.

Thomhill v. Kirkman, 62 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1953).
56 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1952).
Johnson v. Trader, 52 So.2d 333, 336 (Fla. 1951) (may be dictum).
Perhaps. See Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951 ).
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The court also held'" that an agency which serves charges upon a
regulated individual, who defaults thereafter, may act adversely to that
individual without a finding of fact to support the agency action. This
reasonable extcution of agency power was more than counter-balanced
by the invalidation"'-' of an attempted action by a city council to fine
or jail employces found guilty of disobedicence "by a two thirds vote"
of the council. Some agencies' 53 have been permitted rather direct
judicial power, but the lack of judicial procedural safeguards would easily
seem to negate much justification for this particular ordinance.
II. Judicial Due Process (Civil)
An agency sought to enjoin in a circuit court a defendant from
practicing dentistry without a license.' 4 Under the law the injunction
should issue when the agency certified the lack of the license. 'The court
may have held there was a lack of due process in this issuance, on such
evidence. 155 In Denzen Y. Slateoff,1'1 it was held that a fraudulent
conveyance of personal property by a defendant in a civil action could
be set aside, as to the receiver thereof, in a proceeding supplementary to
the civil suit. The only notice was service to the receiver of a rule to
show cause, which stated the claim of the plaintiff and the hearing date.
This was "sufficient notice." In Peeler v. Duval County,1' 7 procedural
due process was not denied in eminent domain proceedings wherein the jury
was allowed to evaluate the pieces of property and the attorneys' fees
without specifically determining the ownership of each piece of property.
The question of ownuership and division of attorney's fees was left to a
future proceeding. The court stated that the same judge could handle
this function in the process of apportioning the money in the registry
of the court. In another eminent domain decision" 8 a state agency was
permitted a speedy procedure for obtaining possession of property. The
procedure was supplementary to the main action, and, under it, defendants
were served and had counsel, appraisers were appointed and no less than
twice the property's appraised value was deposited in the court registry.

This latter amount, if not equal to a later jury evaluation, could be
increased by the court by deficiency judgment.

'[his summary procedure

151. iline v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 61 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1952).
152. Jones v. Slick, 56 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1952).
153. Albertsworth, Administrative Contempt Powers, 25 A.B.A.J. 955 (1939).

154. Peters v. Brown, 55 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1951).

155. It is difficult to say from the language. 'lie agency, at the trial, also sought
to enter the evidence of two witnesses who had been hired by the agency to solicit
dental work from the defendant. Such deliberately purchased evidence seemed to reach
to due process limitations, also.
156. 66 So.2d 483, 485 (Fla. 1953).
157. 66 So.2d 247 (Fla. 1953).
118. State Road Dept. v. Forehanid, 59 So.2d 901 (Ma. 1952).
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is necessary in the execution of public work contracts wherein it is
sometimes necessary to acquire use of land on short notice.
III. Judicial Due Process (Criminal)
A number of factors were determined to be a part of the total

:
picture of adequate criminal judicial due process. In Gerde v. State,t''9
it was held that "the right to have a court correctly and intelligently
instruct the jury on the essential and material elements of the crime"
was part of a "fair and impartial trial." In Cacciatorev. State,' " a concurring
opinion shed some light on confused decisional language. The suggestion

was that separating a negro juror from white jurors under circumstances
which subtract from the "importance of his station as a juror clothes him
with" might deny procedural due process. A somewhat different adverse
effect on procedural due process was' 8 t the statement in argument by the
prosecution that "The time to stop a sexual fiend ...is in the beginning
and not . ..after some poor little child ...lost her life." The charge

was fondling an infant. A fair trial, then, was denied where "prejudicial
emotion" or "punitive or vindictive exhibitions of temperament" were
involved in the trial. Gluck v. State 8 2 was analagous in that the
prosecution's continued remarks about the defendant's "religion, character
and occupation" reflected on a fair trial.
The most interesting case' 63 had to do with change of venue. The
defense offered an expert, on public opinion polls, who was rejected by
the court. A survey had been made in the trial community to determine

if the defendant negro could possibly receive a fair trial in a whitewoman-rape situation. The problem seemed to be whether there was a
dearth of unprejudiced jurors. The poll was representative. rhe actual
questioned, or questioners, were not offered in evidence. It is unfortunate that
more care was not taken on the preparation for trial of this evidence-poll
evidence on change of venue necessity quite conceivably may be the most
accurate. The danger of hearsay was noted.' 4 The court stated that such
a trial "cannot be expected to be a pure procedural gem."" 5 It certainly
was not. The lack of court control over the newspaper press in this
country makes solution of due process requirements, with reference to
change of venue, quite urgent.' 6"
159. 64 So.2d 915, 916 (Fla. 1953) (intent, with charge of breaking and entering
with intent to commit rape, left out).

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

49 So.2d 588, 589-591 (Fla. 1950).
Stewart v. State, 51 So.2d 494, 495 (Fla. 1951).
62 So.2d 71, 73-75 (Fla. 1952) (concurring opinion aired the matter).
Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288, 291 (Fla. 1953).
Yet the witnesses accepted let in hearsay.

165. See note 163 supra, at page 296.
166. Holtzoff, The Relation Between the Right to a Law Trial and the Right of
Freedom of the Press, 1 SYRACUSei L. Rev. 369 (1950).
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IV. Clarity or l)efiniteness of Expression'

67

In State v. Sumter County"8 the court validated as inot too vague
and indefinite a tax "not to exceed five mills per annum." A legislative
authorization to the parole commission of power to supervise defendants
released from the state hospital failed O' since the manner of cxcrcisilg
the power was omitted. The court 170 also voided a city ordinance which
provided that no multiple parking garages should be built except upon
"approval . . . by the city council . . . after a public hearing at which
due consideration shall be given to the effect upon traffic." In a 1952
case' 7 ' the court apparently related the ambiguous features in an ordinance
forbidding construction to exercise by the city of the police power to
regulate private property. The distaste of the court for the regulation
attempt probably was more responsible for the decision, since the ordinance,
in view of its purpose, was fairly certain.'"2 The suggestion was made by
Justice Drew, concurring, 73 that a law closing only certain businesses
on Sunday was invalid for lack of an "ascertainable standard of guilt."
Since the words were "outlying grocery store" it seems the Justice should
be deferred to. His test was when "men of common intelligence must
guess." 'The cases in this small field of the law are of slight precedent value
74
since each depends upon unique facts.'
SELF-INCRIMINATION,

BILL OF ArTAINDER

AND

RROACTIVE LAWS

In Florida State Board of Architecture v. Seymour17c an architect
"ivoluntarily testified before a grand jury and at the trial, for bribery, of

county officials.

The Florida testimonial immunization law exempted

one from any "penalty or forfeiture" on account of certain involuntary

disclosures. The court held that a proceeding by the board of architecture
to revoke the architect's license was a "penalty or forfeiture." Since the
board under its statutory authority has a duty to the public which is
somewhat similar to the duty which the Florida Bar apparently has,
with reference to lawyers and the public, the decision may have consequences
which are unfortunate. 7 6 This immunization law was sensibly restricted
in State v. Grayson.'
The law was stated to be applicable only when
167. One might argue over where to place this section.

168. 60 So.2d 529 (FIla. 1952).
169. Marsh v. Ganvood, 65 So.2d 15 (Rn. 1953).
170. Drexel v. Miami Beach, 64 So.2d 317. 318 (Fkn.
possibility by Commission helped).

1953)

(arbitrary action

171. Town of Bay Harbor Islands v. Schlapek, 57 So.2d 835. 856 (Fla. 1952).
172. The words were "during said period of time,."
173. Henderson v. Antoncci. 62 So.2d 5, 9-10 (Fla. 1952).
174. See, generally, Note, 62 11Am'. L. Rav. 77 (1948).
175. 62 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1952).
176. Would a lawyer similarly be inimtine from any proceedings to revoke or
suspend his license?
177. 55 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla. 1951); accord, McKown v. State, 54 So.2d 54
(Fla. 1951 ).
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the person testifying does so under "compulsion, coercion, or an offer
of immunity." In applying the innuniz ation law in State v. Villard 7 '
the court determined that the use of a search warrant to seize records
for later use in a criminal prosecution violated the privilege against
self-incrimination. The court necdlessly held that both the privilege
against self-incrimination and the privilege against illegal search and seizure
were violated. In another case' 79 a corporation was held not entitled to
the benefits of the privilege, which is in line with the quite general rule
on this subject.
There were two decisions related to the prohibited bill of attainder
in the past two years. In Jones v. Slick, 8" an ordinance was in issue which
provided that all ordinances of the city council should be obeyed by
city officials and that any official who should be found guilty of disobedience
"by a two-thirds vote of the city council" would be fined or imprisoned.
It was held a bill of attainder and invalidated. In Peters v. Brown' 8' a law
which ordered a court to issue an "injunction against one in the exercise
of his business on the certificate of an officer that he does not have a
valid license and gives him no opportunity to be heard" was stated to
82
come "near" to violating the inhibition against Bills of Attainder."' 11
3
One civil decision' presented the possibility of retroactive application
of a law. A civil service board promulgated a rule inhibiting civil service
employees from engaging in the sale of alcoholic beverages. The plaintiff
was a policeman. The city sold him a license to sell liquor and passed
an ordinance zoning his premises for that purpose. The issue was whether
the civil service rule could be applied to plaintiff to sever his connections
with the police department. The court held not-at least not until plaintiff
had "ample" time within which to choose between his civil service position
or continuance in the liquor business. The court, fortunately, did not
foreclose retroactive application of laws reasonably necessary to preserve
the integrity of the civil service system when, as in this ease, the blow
to the employee can be softened.
CONSTITIONAL FACETS OF PROCEDURE' 8
I. Trial by Jurylsr
There was one somewhat unusual decision involving the privilege of
trial by jury. In Sneed v. Mayo 88 a petitioner sought to obtain release
178. 54 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1951).

179. State v. Willard, 54 So.2d 183 (Fla. 1951).
180. 56 So.2d 459, 461 (Fla. 1952).
181. 55 So.2d 334, 335 (Fla. 1951).
182. See Norville, Bill of Attainder, 26 OR.. L. R.v. 78 (1947), for a good
article on this law.
183. Johnson v. Trader, 52 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1951).
184. This assembly of constitutional privileges and rights is treated as well
here as not.
185. This law is well developed in some states. See Mayers, Tit Constitutional
Guarantee of Jury Trial in New York, 7 BROOKLYN L. REv. 180 (1937).
186. 66 So.2d 865, 870-871 (Fla. 1953).
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from imprisonment on original habeas corpus proceedings in the Florida
Supreme Court. The element of unusualness was that petitioner
convinced the court that a hearing on the merits of his arguments was
imperative. Petitioner's letter to one of the justices mentioned that lie
was poor, uneducated, only 21 years old at trial and unfamiliar with
things legal. Hc insisted he so informed the trial judge and that lie
objected to trial without jury. The prison custodian's answer denied
the essentials in petitioner's letter. Attached to the answer was a certified
copy of what trial testimony there was and an affidavit by the trial judge
to the effect that petitioner had waived a jury trial. The lower court
record showed only that there was no jury trial. The supreme court stated
a preference to rely on the "official court record-the only vehicle through
which a court of general jurisdiction can speak officially." This was silent
on any waiver of the "right" to trial by jury made in "open court." This
silence was held to throw serious doubt on the legality of trial. Obviously,
judges will have to insist that waiver be made in open court and that it
appear "affirmatively either from the record proper or from the transcript."
The judge's affidavit was held incompetent. The burden of proof at
the hearing on the merits of petitioner's claim was placed on the petitioner.
Speculation on the number of records which do not reflect such waivers

is fascinating. There were several other cases on the constitutional privilege
of trial by jury.
In Dezen v. Slatcoff '" the court held that a jury trial on controverted
fact issues could be delayed, in proceedings summary in character. In a
supplementary proceeding to set aside a fraudulent transfer, a jury trial
could be requested after the sheriff had levied on the property and after
claimant had filed answer and bond. Also, a request for a jury trial could
be made in "a separate document from the complaint or answer"-even

after, and separate from, the amended complaint. 88
The concurring opinion 9 in Cacciatore v. State indicated that the
entrance into jury duty of the law of segregation of colored and white
citizens may well invalidate a trial proceeding since trial by jury is on a
constitutional basis and humiliation of jurors would cripple their proper
functioning. The door was left ajar for some discriminatory practices. 90
II. Privilege of Counsel
The Florida Constitution, Declaration of Rights, section 2, states
that the accused "shall be heard by himself, or counsel, or both." The
above-mentioned petitioner, in Sneed v. Mayo,"" used this constitutional
187.
188.
189.
190.

66 So.2d 483 (1la. 1953) (civil case).
Nlessana %v.
Maule Industries, 50 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1951) (civil case).
49 So.2d 588, 589.590 (Fla. 1950).
Ibid.

191. See note 186 supra, at pages 871, 872, 874. For survey of the somewhat

confused federal and state law see Comment, 28 'I'x. L. REv. 236 (1949).
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avenue, also. He claimed that he requested counsel, in addition to the
allegations already mentioned. The custodian's answer was similar on
this issue, as was the trial judge's affidavit. The court spelled out a good
deal of general law on this subject, and, being the latest pronouncement,
is of interest. WVaivcr is possible when accused is of "mature age and
judgment." Otherwise? There is no absolute duty for court appointment
of counsel "for indigent defendants except where capital punishment
is involved." Record silence infers that defendant waived benefit of
counsel. This amounts to a presumption, which is overcome by a "showing
that the accused was incapable, because of age, ignorance, or lack of
mental capacity, of representing himself." Defendant's capacity is a
factual issue. A finding on this point by the "trier of facts," supported
by evidence of record, will stand on review. Lack of such "finding" means
the competency issue may be raised in a "post conviction proceeding." The
court made a plea for complete trial transcripts, which is understandable.
The trial judge's affidavit was held incompetent. Case was set for
hearing on the merits. The burden on this issue, too, was placed upon
petitioner. It is difficult from reading the decision to determine whether
the conclusion was based upon state or federal constitutional law.
Ill. Constitutional Privilege to Cross Examination and the Grand Jury
In Coco v. State' 2 the court held that an adequate cross examination
in a criminal trial was "an absolute right." This was a "right of a full
. . . cross examination of a witness upon subjects the door to which is
pushed ajar on direct examination." 'I'c court rcfcrrcd to the Florida
Constitution, Declaration of Rights, section 2, which provided that the
accused shall have the right to "meet the witnesses against him face to
face" in open court. The area of permissible cross examination is generally
dealt with as one over which the trial court has a large discretion. Assuming
this, the decision, on the facts, was not too impressive.
The Florida Constitution, Declaration of Rights, section 10, provides
that, "No person shall be tried for a capital crime unless on presentment
or indictment by a grand jury." There is also authorization to the
legislature to regulate the number of grand jurors. A grand jury of 23
members was recently held valid.10 3
IV. The Bail Situation
After a conviction for rape a defendant applied to the trial court
for supersedeas bond pending appeal. 9 4 Rape is a capital offense. rmhe
Florida Constitution, l)cclaration of Rights, section 9, states that, "All
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offense
192. 62 So.2d 892, 896 (Fla. 1953).
193. Lightfoot v. State, 64 So.2d 261, 265-266 (Fla. 195;) (on rehearing).
194. Cray v. State, 54 So.2d 436, 437 (Fla. 1951).
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where the proof is evident or the presumption great." The issue was
whether the defendant was "entitled to bail pending appeal despite the
fact he was recommended to mercy and sentenced to fifteen ycars." The
court held that this matter was within the "sound discretion of the (trial)
court." The Florida Supreme Court then exercised its discretion and nade
this fact situation bailable. In Larkin v. Stateu1 5 the petitioner was charged
with murder. The court determined that such a charge placed the burden
of proof on the petitioner to show that proof of his guilt was not "evident
or the presumption great." If the evidence showed no more than a
"probability of guilt" bond should be granted. The evidence in this case
was taken at a coroner's inquest and with a confession demonstrated
"evident" guilt.
V. Double Jeopardy
There were several cases involving the Florida Constitution, Declaration
of Rights, section 12, which provides that "No person shall be subject to
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." In State v. Cootner, 9
the defendant was charged with burning the personal property of William
Cootner. The court, at the conclusion of the states evidence, granted a
motion for directed verdict on the ground that the allegation of ownership
was quite material. A motion to quash a second information was filed on
the ground of double jeopardy-that the particular ownership of the
property was not material, and the same evidence except as to ownership
would be used in the second case. The court disallowed the defendant's
inconsistent stand. The two informations were held to charge separate
offenses. There was then no double jeopardy. The court also referred
to a doctrine of estoppel. State v. Anders 8'" was a similar case. The rule
was stated to be that "if the facts charged in a subsequent information
would, if found to be true, have warranted a conviction upon a prior
information, a prosecution under the subsequent information is barred."
The court refused to consider an estoppel argument.
The issue in State v. Lewis'9 was whether one was immunized "from a
second trial on the ground of double jeopardy" where the court "declared a
mistrial because he was convinced that the rights of the defendant were
prejudiced, account of the false swearing" of defendant's witnesses. A
discharge of jury was held to be authorized only because of "manifest
necessity." Lacking this, a plea of double jeopardy would prevail. The
discretion of the judge was held to be large and defendant's consent
to discharge was an important factor. Here it was held that the jury
195,.
196.
197.
198.

51
60
59
55

So.2d
So.2d
So.2d
So.2d

185 (Fla. 1951).
734 (Fla. 1952).
776,777 (Fa. 1952) (a larceny of automobile charge).
118, 119 (Fla. 1951).
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determines veracity of witnesses so the defendant was "placed in jeopardy."
Generally, it would seem, the trial judge's determination of "manifest
necessity" will not be interfered with by the reviewing court.'
E1"QUAL PROTErCION

SITUATION-"

The strength of the equal protection limitation on governmental power
to a greater or lesser degree depends upon the relative strength of the
governmental police power.2 0' Probably no law is aplied to all persons at
one and the same time. Children, the insane, women, men, the unhealthy,
corporations and wage earners, to name a few, have been the basis of
classification in the operation of law. So the basic premise we start with
is that some classifications, in application of law, are legally possible. That
delightfully vague statement is made even more ephemeral by the test,
which is in vogue in Florida,"2 that a classification is valid unless
demonstrated to be not "reasonable." It would probably be impossible
to draw a line between the "reasonable" of police power exercise and
the "reasonable" of equal protection. Both are, finally, a matter of how
the Florida Supreme Court subjectively thinks. As with the review, by
the court, of police power regulations the review of equal protection
situations lies largely in the self-restraint the court chooses to impose
upon itself.

1. The Non-Negro Cases203
\Vhcre the Florida Supreme Court generally permits a large police
power activity in the stal e tie equal protection limitation is quite limp.
In Rodriguez v. Jones2 0 the court validated a distance limitation between
gambling enterprises which had the effect of creating a gambling
monopoly in the state's largest county. A city ordinance, passed as a
health measure, required that only milk pasteurized within the county
be sold within the city. The plaintiff dairy, which had a pasteurization
plant located some miles away, met every conceivable health requirement.
The court placed the burden of establishing invalidation upon the
plaintiff. 20 5 This burden the plaintiff carried well. The court held the
ordinance invalid under the Federal and State Constitutions, without any
199. State v. Lewis, 54 So.2d 199, 200, 201 (Fl];.

1951)

(iulawful attempt to

communicate with jury led to mlstrial).
200. The statement in FI.A. CoNST. D'cr..

OF Ricirts, § 1, is that "all men are
equal before the law . . ." 'he federal equal protection clause, applicable to state

action, is found in U.S,

CONST. Ah[.nz. XIV, § I.
201. Au iipressive article on the federal concept can he found in 'I'ussmau and
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAImr. L. R~v. 341 (1949).

202. E.g., Rodriguez v. ]ones, 64 So.2d 278 (Fla. 19;3).
Whether a law is
is still the test for economic clue process, Note 53 Coni.. L. Rl:s'. 6 (1953).
203. This classification is a natural in Florida.

'reasonable

204. See note 202 supra.
205. Gustapon v. Ocala, 53 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1951). One disturbing note was
that the court apparently reversed the presumption of validity with city ordinances.
Why?
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particular differentiation in policies or aims. This ambiguity was found
in practically all of the non-negro decisions in this area. A law imposing
a limitation on tort actions against a municipality was held constitutional
even though the limitation was not common to actions against private
individuals and corporations.20 6 The state power over municipalities is,
of course, extraordinarily broad. It was held that equal protection of
the laws was not denied by the operation of a 23 man grand jury which
required, for one county, more dissenting members to preclude an indictment
than with grand juries in other counties. 207 Classification under the state
20 8
taxation power proved relatively simple to maintain.
Two important invalidations occurred. In one200 the court invalidated
several sections of the "Sunday Closing Laws." These legally unhealthy
exemptions ran from newspaper publishing to tourist concessions. The
court appeared to have reversed the presumption of validity. "It is
necessary that there be a . . . substantial reason to make such laws
operate only upon certain classes." The law was a health measure.
The court thought that individuals working for the exempted businesses
needed just as much rest. Honesty compels the admission that the
Mikell v. Henderson210 invalidation was not important, but it is rewarding.
A pcnal law on cruelty to animals stated that it should not apply to
"poultry shipped on steamboats or other crafts." The court found no
distinction "between the fighting of roosters on a steamboat . . . and
the fighting of roosters on land."
11. The Negro Cases2 t '
In these cases, one can say that Florida constitutional law and federal
constitutional law separate. The possible local equal protection of the
laws restriction on governmental power is practically as if it did not
exist. The march of the United States Supreme Court up the broad
equal protection of the laws avenue, with reference to equal treatment
for citizens regardless of color, 212 has not been matched by the Florida
Supreme Court. The Federal Supreme Court has, slowly, been crushing
the once wide discretionary segregation fields within the states' police
power. This leaves the quite larger private action discretionary field of
206. Coleman v. St. Petcrsburg. 62 So.2d 409 (lIla. 1953); c. Johnson v.
Livingston, 65 So.2d 744 ( la. 1953).
207. Lightfoot v. State, 64 So.2d 261, 265 (Fla. 1952) (rehearing).
208. Orlando v.Natural Gas & Appliance Co., 57 So.2d 853 (la. 1952); accord,
Gasson v.Gay, 49 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1950).
209. Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So.2d 5. 7-8 (Flia. 1952).
210. 63 So.2d 508, 509 (Fla. 1953). The dissent of Mr. justice Mathews in Smith
v. Ervin. 64 So.2d 166, 171-5 (la. 1953), discussed the possibility of the denial of
equal protection of the laws in the recently enacted election code. Thnt law prov'ided
for supervision of funds expended in "furtherance" of a candidate, but was silent on
funds expended in "opposition" to a candidate.

211. With few exceptions, and this is one, this paper does not deal with the
Florida Supreme Court's determination of federal constitutional law.
212. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
segregation. Some state legislation has dealt there perhaps even more
harshly.2 3 'Tie recent Florida decisions cannot be characterized as
particularly sympathetic to the aspirations of colored citizens to weaken
the legal and social segregation framework presently existent in Florida.
state court is not unnatural
This attitude on the part of our highest
-14
colniunity.
the
of
mores
the
considering
The vocational school cases a' 5 excluded the negro citizens from a
state supported school on the ground of lack of qualifications. In both
cases the school authorities admitted that no negro citizens would be
admitted. In one case under the school rules the petitioner's occupation
was not related sufficiently to the class to which he sought admittance.
In the second case the court found the relator had a physical disability
which under school rules disqualified him. Appropriate evidence was
introduced on the trial level to bolster the court's factual findings. Since
the denial was not based "solely" on color the decisions were under the
shadow of United States Supreme Court decisions.
Perhaps the University of Florida College of Law cases were not
that fortunate.2 0 In State v. Board of Control2 7 the court, in effect,
held that exclusion of a negro citizen from the state supported college
of law was legal after finding that a state supported college of law had
been "established" for negro citizens which was not merely on "paper."
The court blandly determined that Sweatt v. Painter2-8 and McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education2 19 did not indicate that
"any segregation was unlawful" in a state supported graduate college of
law. 220 Legal opinion Oil the effect of those United States Supreme
The Florida Supreme Court, in 1951,
Court decisions is plentiful.'
analyzed these decisions with little difficulty-in a case to which application
would not be absolutely necessary. 222 The relator, in State v. Board of
Control, was before the court three times. rhe procedural hurdles which
lie was forced to overcome were impressive.22 3 Lack of adequate qualifications and procedural problems plagued the petitioners and relators in
these actions. The slowness with which state supreme courts respond to
United States Supreme Court dctcrminations, on segregation in public
schools, is not unique to the Florida Supreme Court; it is highly unlikely,
213. Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 837 (1947).
214. Which the court can but reflect.
215. State v. Anderson, 62 So.2d 343, 345 (Fla. 1952); State v. Anderson, 61 So.2d
920 (Fla. 1952).
216. State v. Board of Control, 60 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1952) (case before the court
three times-appeal pending before United Stales Sopremte Court).
217. Ibid.
218. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).

219. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
220. Rice v. Arnold, 54 So.2d 114, 120 (Fla. 1951).
221. Roche, Education, Segregation and the Supreme Court-A Political Analysis,
99 U. o" PA. L. Re:v. 949 (1951); Note, 30 B.U.L. Rlv. 565 (1950).
222. See note 220 supra.
223. This was the third appearance of the case in the court.
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regardless of actual decision, that cases pending before the United States
Supreme Court will result in immediate monumental change.2"
There was a municipal golf course case in 1951225 in which the court,
directed by the United States Supreme Court to reconsider, re-evaluated
its former position. The conclusion of the court was the same. The
Swealt and McLaurin decisions were held limited to graduate law schools.
Segregation on a municipal golf course was held valid if reasonable hours

were granted the negro relator. In effect the relator was told to go to a
lower court and petition for more time (segregated) on the golf course.
This decision did not manhandle the applicable United States Supreme
Court decisions.
As the writer has already suggested, the Florida law on equal
protection of the laws and negro segregation doubtless is practically
non-existent. At least in practice, Federal constitutional law rides alone.
UNREASONABLE SEIZURES AND SEARCHtES

This provision220 in our Florida Constitution has had a healthy life
during the past two years. Perhaps a few more years of such judicial
activity and law enforcement officers who operate under it will stride
confidently up to erring citizens, march triumphantly into court with
the results of a legal search and seizure and, later, not be disciplined
by the Florida Supreme Court for a certain lack of prognostic powers 22 7powers which, this writer believes, no one could demonstrate on present
materials .228
1.'I'fe Automobile Cases
The searches and seizures restriction on government power insures
that in a great number of ordinary police searches there has been a prior
entrance on the scene by a magistrate who has been convinced that there
is sufficient220 reason for bothering a citizen and his effects. This checks
the momentum of the police action. The laws requiring the magistrate
to make a similar entrance soon after arrest have much the same purpose.
But universal usage of the search warrant is impractical in several instances
224. Leflar and Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 lIARv. L. R[v.
377 (1954) (an excellent survey article).
225. See note 220 supra.
226. FLA. CONST. DECL. or RICHTS, § 22 (1951): "'lhe right of the people to
be secure in their persons, honscs, papers and effects against unreasonable seiZTres
and searches, shall not be violated and no warrants issued, but upon probable cause,
supported

by oath or affirmation,

particularly describing the place or places to be

searched and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized."
227. I hesitate to cite Frank.

The less controversial

Dickinson,

in

The Law

Behind Law, 29 COL. L. Rp:v. 114, 284 (1929), will do as well ou rules and judicial

discretion.

228. The decisions do not lay out a pattern sufficient for predictive purposes.

There are any number of rood articles covering many phases of this troubled legal

restriction.

E.g., Rudd, Present Significance of Constitutional Guarantees Against

UnreasonableSearches and Seizures, 18 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 387 (1949).
229. The amonot of sufficiency depends on the particular state policy.
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-and the fast moving automobile is one of these. Are all automobiles
beyond the protection of a search warrant? If the occupants of a moving
automobile may be stopped, and arrested, may there be a search without
warrant? If so, when is the arrest legal? Will legality of arrest create
so many exceptions to the rule that eventually the policies behind valid
arrests will dominate validity of searches and seizures? This writer wishes
the recent cases did answer these questions. Some trends in the automobile
cases are discernible.
The "naked eye" exception is the easiest to justify. For example, in
Fletcher v. State= 0 officers had watched the defendant for some time.
Defendant was suspected of bolita dealings. As defendant entered his
car an officer stopped him. Before arrest or search the officer saw bolita
equipment protruding from defendant's pocket and on the car seat.
Arrest and search followed without warrant. The court held that the
officer saw a crime committed in his presence. This validated the arrest.
This, in turn, validated the search and seizure. The arrest is important
then. In Collins v. State,23 ' officer had information defendant was a bolita
gambler and followed defendant's car a mile. Defendant drove a foot
over the center line on the highway three times. Defendant was halted.
An officer picked up a raincoat on the back seat of defendant's car;
gambling materials were under it. The arrest was on a traffic charge.
The court properly distinguished between prerequisites for search warrants
for houses and cars. The test for arresting officers was "probable cause."
The officer had to have "trustworthy information" the car carried contraband;
or "reasonable belief" the car was so engaged. The "probable cause"
test followed the language of the law on issuance of search warrants.
This brought the magistrate into the picture without his actual presence.
An officer must, then, have had sufficient reasons to convince a magistrate
a warrant should issue, if he had applied for one. A magistrate would
have rightfully refused here since all the officer could say was that he had
been "informed" about the car's contents. If the arrest is illegal everything
2 32
after that, in the way of a search and seizure, is probably illegally obtained.
These traffic violation possibilities may be over-emphasized. The court
has refused to consider whether it is necessary to have even a slight
relationship between the seized property and the crime for which defendant
is arrested.233 However, the court has gone to some lcngths to fail to
234
find a traffic violation in these cases.
230. 65 So.2d 845. 847 (Fla. 1953).
§ 901.21(2) (1951) is difficult to assay.

The effect of such laws as

FL.A.

STAT.

231. 65 So.2d 61, 64 (Hla. 1953).
232. Brown v. State, 62 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1952), was similar-a traffic violation.
Here, however, the officers had no suspicions at all. Accord, Graham v. State, 60
So.2d 186 (Fla. 1952) (crossing center line); Burley v. State, 59 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1952)
(passing on curve).
233. See note 231 suprd.
234. See note 232 supra.
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A somewhat different factual situation was Kramer v. State.23 5 There,
an officer had an anonymous tip that two cars stopped at a locality each
night for a month. Later, when the cars stopped the officers ran up.
One car escaped and was lost to pursuit. The pursuing officer "took a
chance" that a moving car was the same one and stopped it. The officer
flashed his light in the car's interior and picked up a package there. Later
one of the car's occupants attempted to hide a package. These parcels
later were found to contain lottery numbers. The court held an illegal
search started when the officer picked up the package. There was no search
warrant and no lawful arrest.230 The action of the occupant in trying
to hide the package was not sufficient to validate the arrest since the
illegal "search" had started and all that followed was illegal. Later the
court distinguished this case under similar facts. 237 Officers followed tle
defendant's car without his knowledge. He parked and became frightened
when the officer's car parked and its lights were turned on. He threw bolita
tickets a distance of 20 to 30 feet into brush. Arrest and search followed.
The arrest and search were held legal since the defendant's action
apparently gave the officers probable cause for belief that a crime was
being committed. The important difference from the Kraemer case
was held to be that the attempted concealment there followed the illegal
search. It also made a difference, as to when a search starts, if the
defendant knows he is being followed. The officer's intention did not
matter. This is a rather strange distinction-the defendant's state of
mind. The court, also, de-emphasized the arrest. The probable cause
involved may not be necessary for the arrest here, but for a search for a
package thrown by defendant on land not owned or controlled by him.SX
The decision is not a thing of clarity.
II. Non-Automobile Cases
Here, as in the automobile cases, a valid arrest eliminated the search
warrant necessity. The court seemed more likely to declare the arrest
illegal where the officers brashly operated without a search warrant, probably
with high hopes of obtaining that magical legal arrest.231' This was, of
course, not difficult to manage when the officer actually saw the crime
committed; this was true even when what was seen was innocuous without
unique knowledge in the officer of criminal methods.2 40 One restriction
the court placed oii the privilege, which conceivably could grow to
235. 60 So.2d 615, 616 (Fla. 1952).

236. Since the packages were not opened until the officers reached the station.
237. Mitchell v. State, 60 So.2d 726, 728 (Fla. 1952).
238. Id. at 728. Another case, Kersey v, State, 58 So.2d 155, 156 (Fla. 1952), had a
similar approach.
239. Dickens v. State, 59 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1952) (the officers trespassed before
seeing the gambling equipment, and arresting).

240. Rodriguez v. State, 58 So.2d 164 (Fila. 1952); accord, Burnside v. State,

55 So.2d 107 (Fla. 1931).
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dwarf it, was that the privilege only extended to one's "dwelling house"
and not to those who are "at most visitors in an empty house." 21' To be
able to claim the privilege "one must claim and prove himself to be the
owner, occupant, or lessee of the premises searched." What does this
mean?
The invalid search warrant cases were more complicated. In Borrego
v. State,2 '2- an affidavit for search warrant stated that:
... affiant, for the past two weeks, in the course of an investigation
has seen a number of persons known to be bolita peddlers,
...
entering and leaving the house . . . and has learned from the
aforesaid investigation that there are within the house gambling
implements . . . and that affiant has information from other
persons that unlawful gambling . . . is actually being operated
within said building ...
This was held insufficient. The affidavit had to state "sufficient reasons"
why the officer believed laws were being violated. It was necessary to state
"evidence" (apparently competent in a jury trial) which would "lead
243
a man of prudence . .. to believe" an offense was being committed.
This language is quite restrictive on police activities. It eliminates, for
example, all hearsay evidence. The court's position on this judicial limb
is shaky.
The most delightfully confused case was State v. Willard.2 4 A Dade
County Grand Jury employed an individual who believed relators were
operating gambling houses. He obtained a circuit court search warrant
authorizing him to enter realtors' offices in an office building, not owned
or used by them for gambling purposes, and to seize their books "for
use as evidence . . . before the . . .grand jury and in any prosecution
which [might] follow." He seized the records under the warrant.
Information found therein was used to return an indictment and an
information was filed based upon the indictment. The court stated the
problem to be whether this use of a search warrant violated the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. 24 5 It was held that warrants cannot
be utilized to search "solely for the purpose" of securing evidence to be
used in a later criminal trial. Warrants validly could be used to seize
property only when the public or complainant had an interest therein
or when possession thereof was unlawful. Otherwise the court feared
the use of such seizures amounted to compelling a defendant to be a
witness against himself. This holding is predicated on the rule that the
privilege against self-incrimination does extend to documents. The
241. Mixon v. State, 54 So.2d 190, 192 (Fla. 1951).
242. 62 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1953) (petition for clarification, pp. 45-47).
243. Cf. Shaw v. State, 53 So.2d 772 (Fla. 1951); accord. Averill v. State, 52 So.2d
791 (Fla. 1951).
244. 54 So.2d 179, 180, 182 (Fla. 1951).
245. IFLA. CONST. DECL. or RIcHTS § 12 (1951).

246. Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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disturbing factor in the decision, to this writer, is the mixing of concepts.
Self-incrimination and search and seizure are quite distinct privileges. The
policies underlying each are different. The earlier similar confusion by
the United States Supreme Court was not spectacularly successful. 24" The
court did state here that the search was illegal, so perhaps that factor
was the real basis for the decision.2 47 The court gave weight to the
"harmless . . . character" of the records.

Would a gun be different?

Why? The fundamental question is why mix the concepts.
of the seized property under either privilege would be sufficient.

Exclusion

IlL. The Beverage License Consent Cases
The state police power is naturally broad enough to condition liquor
licensing and acceptance of such licenses means that the "places of
business of licensees shall always be subject to . . . search during business

hours by Beverage Department" supervisors or police officers. 248 This
little known provision recently created some legal business. In Boynton
v. State,249 officers entered the front door of the Flamingo Club building,
which led to a small bar. They omitted inspection for beverage act
violations and walked through the club rooms, 150 feet, to a small
back room. The club was leased to several of the defendants. It was
not open for business. The small bar was open for business. The
back room door was shut; the officers pushed it open. They did not see
gambling equipment until well into the room. Arrest and search and
seizure followed. The court invalidated the arrest, search and seizure.
The decision was reasonable. There was no search warrant involved.
The club was leased to some of the defendants, but was not open for
business; the small bar in which beverages were sold had no connection
with the club, or the back room. The rest of the defendants had no
connection with the bar or club. The beverage act stated that "places
of business of licensees" should be open for inspection without warrant
"during business hours." This language was not met here. All rooms
under one roof are not affected by the liquor license; only those having
some connection with the liquor license. Here no defendants had this
license. The licensee had no "control" over the back room. There was
no valid arrest. Presence of citizens in liquor establishments did not make
them subject to search. The court indicated that it might make a
difference if beverage officers really entered to investigate beverage act
violations,250
247. I doubt it. The immunization stattte, for forced disclosures, was applied
in the case; see note 244 supra, at page 182.
248. Boynton v. State, 64 So.2d 536, 541 (Fla. 1953), recites beverage act.
249. Id. at 536.

250. Lopez v. State, 66 So.2d 807, 810 (Fla. 1953) amplified the Boynton case.
The charge was gambling. Beverage agents went to a liquor lounge in the morning
to make a moonshine investigation. License not isssed to defendants, but one defendant
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The court dealt with a few non-beverage license consent cases. It
was held not necessary to object to search of the person where guns were
displayed. 25 ' A wife's statement in the place of business to "look anywhere"
did not extend to the family home, a separate nearby house. 52 Consent
after the illegal search had begun was held inoperative.2 -3 It is possible
that the court held that a consent to search unaccompanied by any prior
knowledge of the crime in the officer was insufficient. 25 4 In Irvin v. State,2
the defendant, in a rape case, told officers the clothes he wore the night
before were at his home. An officer appeared at his mother's house and
requested the clothes. She, followed by the officer, went to the defendant's
room, for which he paid rent, and, after securing the clothes, handed
them to the officer. The family relationship impressed the court. It is
interesting to speculate how far the court meant to go. Just who can
consent for whom? The fact that the woman was colored and might
have been somewhat awed by the uniform received slight consideration.
IV. Conclusion
It is to be hoped that decisional activity will eventually demonstrate
to police officers a safe path to search and seizure. Wrong guesses generally
release criminals to try again. The court did one very fine thing in this
area recently and that was to discover that the Federal Constitution fails
to limit these Florida activities .21 The court, unfortunately, failed to
distinguish between due process and the search and seizure privilege in
257
the same case.
BOND FINANC1NC AND THE FLORIDA

CONSTIru'roN,

ARTICLE IX,

SECTION 6

The legal developments in Florida during the last two years in state,
county and municipal bond financing have not been startling. Public works
and improvements are evil necessities which have to be financed. Without
constitutional restrictions the various creatures of government could, and
was in charge (bartender). On the officer's entrance the bartender ran to a spot behind
the bar and pushed a buzzer, which made a sound in a back rooin.
The agents
thought lie was after a gin, that lie signaled to destroy evidence, and they seized hbin.

One agent announced who lie was, heard activity behind the door, and kicked the
door to the backroom in. The other defendant was there. So were bolita slips.
Court held that since the agents here were after liquor violation evidence, the buzzer

connected the lounge and the backroom, the bartender was so suspicious, the backromo
was "contiguous to the bar" and under the bartenders control, the entrance into the
backroom was legal. The arrest, after sight of the bolita slips, was also legal. (This

weakened the consent application).
The seizure was legal.
Cf. Rivers v. State,
59 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1952).
251. See note 249 supra (a beverage case, but actual consent was an issue).
252. Rivers v. State, 59 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1952) (a beverage case).
253. Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1953).
254. Escobia v. State, 64 So.2d 766 (Fla. 1953)

the case holds).
255. 66 So.2d 288, 293 (Via. 1953).
256. See note 248 supra.
257. Id. at 554.

(It is difficult to determine what
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would, borrow money without reference to the tax structure the future
would bear. 'lse Florida Constitution, Article IX, Section 6, contains the
major restrictions on such bond issues:
Tie Legislature shall have power tb provide for issuing State
bonds only for the purpose of repelling invasion or suppressing
insurrection, and the Counties, Districts, or Municipalities of the
State of Florida shall have power to issue bonds only after the
same shall have been approved by a majority of the votes cast
in an election in which a majority of the freeholders who are
qualified electors residing in such Counties, Districts, or
Municipalities shall participate ...
Tluis provision refers only to "bonds," practically insures no state bond
issucs and definitely relates the business of paying for public improvements
to the local people who will bear the tax burdens. The legal history
of this constitutional endeavor can be characterized in terms of the devices
',s The
the Supreme Court of Florida has fashioned to get around it.
description given the instrument in the particular decision will be followedgenerally "bond" or "certificate."
I. State Agency Financing
Various state agencies have been permitted by the court to enter
bonding arrangements which do not involve general obligations of the
stateY."
The recent cases in this area were not unique. In State v.
Board of Control2 0 the legislature authorized the building of a demonstration
school on the Florida State University campus. The Florida Board
of Control authorized issuance of revenue certificates to pay for the
construction. Leon County and the Board of Control contracted for the
board to build and staff the school and for the county to send approximately
700 children to the school at $141 a child, each year. The court held
these certificates not to be "bonds." The test whether the certificate was
a "bond" was ".

.

. whether or not the taxing power of the State may be

called on to service or discharge it." The decision was not difficult since
the certificatcs stated that payment was to be solely from the project's
6
revenue and that the credit of the State was not involved.2 '
A slightly more unusual case was State v.Florida State Improvement
Cormu,;ission " wherein the improvement commission contracted to build
a bridge, and to issue revenue bonds therefor, with the Florida State
258, Patterson, Legal Aspects of Florida Municipad Bond Financing, 3 FLA. L. REv.
287 (1953). "liis article is excellent-it covers the subject in a quite complete sense.
259. Id. at 301-304.
260. 65 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1953).
261. State v. Board of Control, 66 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1953), is a similar case.
Here the board issued revenue certificates to finance construction of university dormitories.
The board's resolution stated the certificates were to be serviced solely from the project's
net revenues and were not state obligations. The court held no freeholders' election
was necessary.
262. 52 So.2d 277 (FIa. 1951).
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Road Department. The road department leased the bridge from the
improvement commission with the department's rental and purchase
payments to be the bridge operation's gross toll. The road department
was to pay maintenance costs. The court found these bonds not the
constitutional "bonds" since the tolls were to be used, solely, to service
them. To this writer it appears that such an arrangement-with the
gross tolls to service the bonds and a state agency contracting to pay
maintenance costs for many years-approaches utilization of the state's
general credit.
IT. County Financing
In a very real sense about all one can state that occurred in this
area of constitutional debt was that quite a number of counties borrowed
money. Some possible decisional distinctions were drawn, however, in the
court's ever present efforts to write exceptions into this constitutional
restriction.
Certificates payable from improvement revenues.-State v. Escambia
County263 exemplifies this judicial exception quite well. There the county,
desiring to develop a resort beach area, issued revenue bonds to finance
the project, the bonds to be paid by revenues from the project. The
court's finding that the bonds would not be a "debt of the county" and
that the "taxing power . . . is in no manner . . . obligated" apparently

was enough to validate. 2 4 In these situations attorneys writing the
particular financial obligation apparently will be safe if they incorporate
language of sufficient strength to restrict debt servicing to revenues from
the improvement so that the holder of the obligation cannot later force
28 3
the county to tax.
Financing on a necessity basis.-This judicial exception to the constitution means, quickly, that Article IX, section 6, does not apply when
a county wishes to finance an improvement which is "necessary," in
something of a vital sense, to the county. In State v. Florida State
Improvement Commission20 the court stated that a city jail or courthouse
is in "a different class from any other . . . county undertaking," that they
are an "absolute . . . county necessity." The test on "necessity" was
whether "private individuals . . . have . . . authority .

the improvement.

.

. to provide"

67
In the decisional language the court drastically

263. 52 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1951).
264. Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. MacVicar, 63 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1953); State N'.
Dade County, 62 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1953); and Bessemer Properties v. 1'eters, 51 So.2d
786 (Fla. 1951), are quite similar.
265. See Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. MacVicar, sura.
266. 60 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1951).
267. The earlier case was State v. Florida State Improvement Commission,
48 So.2d 165, 167 (Fla. 1950). In Sunshine Const. of Key West v. Board of Comni'rs,
Munroe County, 54 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1951), a jail and courthouse certificate issue
got safely by, at least as a strong county necessity. The case did limit these "necessity"
of said County" could not be "irrevocably
bonds so that (p. 526) "the full faith ...
pledged."
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limited an earlier statement on "necessity" which made the "necessity"
parallel to a valid "county purpose." The court indicated these particular
bonds probably would give holders power to force the county into a
mandatory duty to tax, so the issue failed without an approving vote
by local freeholders. Strangely, voting machine purchases were held iI
State v. Broward County-'' not to be "essential governmental necessities."
One could argue with this conclusion.
In general.-Two recent cases are difficult to reconcile. In State v.
Volusia County School Bldg. Authority0"- the court invalidated a revenue
bond issue which obligated the county to pay for bonds from funds of
the county board of public instruction since the board had no discretionary
surplus. In State v. Board of Control 270 a county board obligated itself
to pay for certificates "from the current revenues or other funds first
available to the board . ..in the next succeeding year."

The concurring

opinion2 71 of Mr. Justice Matthews indicated that the validating decree
cured this-certainly a novel approach; if carried very far this constitutional
area will soon be pass6. Perhaps in both situations the county could
be forced to levy taxes.
III. Municipal Financing
It is difficult to determine whether the county-municipal problems,
inherent in governmental bonds under Article IX, Section 6, arc
distinguishable on any basis founded in reality. Constitutional municipal
financing has followed, however, the general exceptions laid down by the
supreme court for counties.
Certificates payable from other than ad valorem taxation.-State v.

Jacksonville2l - well demonstrates the variable limits to this exception to
Article IX, Section 6. There the city issued certificates in the amount of
of $400,000 to acquire recreational facilities, to be payable solely from a
fund to which the city covenanted to appropriate $100,000 annually for
four years in the city budget, from revenues not already pledged other
than ad valorem and cigarette taxes. The court validated the issue,
apparently holding that such certificates do not have to be payable
from the project financed or from a pledge of a designated excise tax.
The court did require that the arrangements be financially sound-finding
Jacksonville's unpledged revenues, running over $3,000,000 annually, were
adequate. Lawyers handling city bonding will, here also, find it necessary
to write the certificates so as not to obligate the city ad valorem tax
power. The court emphasized that no approving local vote was necessary
268. 54 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1951).
269. 60 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1952)

270. See note 260 supra.
271. Id. at 474.

272. 53 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1951).

(FA.

CONST. Art. XI1,

§ 17, was also dealt with).
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if any tax basis, other than "ad valorem taxes," was utilized sincc Article IX
was "designed to protect the home and real estate owner." There were
several other similar recent cases.21a

Probably, bonds "payable .. . from

revenues derived from the utilities service, excise taxes, licenses or other
sources than ad valorem taxes" will gain in municipal popularity. 27 4 Making
certificates payable solely from the proposcd project's revenue was, of
course, found valid.-?' 5 'lhe court seldom proved troublesome. In one
case 276 a city's stockade certificates, serviced from a "sinking fund supported
solely from the proceeds of fines "from municipal court sentences,"
required an approving vote. Perhaps the closeness to a governmental
function as opposed to the proprietary function explains the decision. In
Chase v. Sanford277 the court indicated that revenue bonds which approach
negotiability under the Negotiable Instruments Law, in containing a
promise to pay "unconditionally," will fail. rIme possible future duty of
the city to tax was the apparent concern of the court.
Financingon a necessity basis.-Thc recent cases involving this exception
to Article IX were not unusual. The court, as in the past, determined 278
that "provisions for governmental needs" do not require an approving
vote. The unpredictability here is a proper city "need." The construction
of an incincrator and a garbage disposal project was validated. The dicta
was confusing for the court suggested that even in this exception servicing
the debt certificates from other than ad valorcm taxes was important.
2T7
wherein the court held
A questionable decision was State v. Alian4i
the construction of a stockade not an "essential" governmental need, such
as a jail or courthouse. This was a doubtful conclusion.28 0
IV. Miscellany
The court held that Article IX, Section 6, in stating that "the Counties,
Districts or Municipalities . . . shall have power to issue bonds only

after the same shall have been approved by a majority of the votes cast in
an election in which a majority of the freeholders .

.

. shall participate"

273. Gate City Garage v. Jacksonville, 66 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1953) (specifically
pledged revenue here, however); State v. Miami Shores Village, 60 So.2d 541 (lia. 1952)
(revenue certificates payable solely from city utilities franchise); State v. City of
Homestead, 59 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1952) (cigarette tax rcvenues pledged).
274. State v. Miami, 62 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1953).
275. State v. St. Petersburg, 61 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1952); Stale v. Jacksonville.
50 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1951) (same). See State v. Fort Lauderdale, 60 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1952),
where the court permitted financing from the project's revencs and a specially
pledged utilities tax.
276. State v. Miami, 63 So.2d 33; (Fla. 195;).

277. 54 So.2d 370, 373 (Fla. 1951),
278. Jacksonville v. Nichols Engineering & Research Corp., 49 So.2d 529, 530
(Fla. 1950).
279. See note 276 supra.
280. See, generally, State v. City of North Miami Beach, 63 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1953):
Nelson v. Fort Lauderdale, 54 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1951).
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means just that.2

'Fhe cffect of re-rcgistration of freeholders of a county
before an election under Article IX, Section 6, was discusscd in State V.
8 -' in which it was held that all that was necessary was
County of Sarasota,2
a "reasonable opportunity to the citizens to register."2 3 The amount of
publicity, quantitatively and qualitatively, was a matter of concern to the
court-a reasonable prerequisite to re-registration.
V. Conclusion
Unless one is particularly interested in governmental financing this
constitutional provision, as such, means little. Yet to the initiated there
is much of import' here. Prior to the adoption of Article IX. Section 6,
it has been stated that the "only acts necessary for the issuance of . . .
bonds and the levy . . . and collection of ad valorem taxes were to have
a delegation in the Legislature from the county who would put through
a special act . . . and then bonds could be issued . ..

without any vote

of the freeholders or the people who had to pay the bill. 28 14 The differing
rationale behind the various twists21ss the supreme court has taken are
simply that "to suggest that the freeholders will not wisely determine the
matter is to suggest the unwisdom of democratic governmcnt 11 as opposed
to the attitude that democracy has been exercised when the local people
vote for local representation. The pressure by the counties and cities to
finance needed long-range improvements-and without "democratic governments" second chance vote-is presently mirrored in the Florida decisions.
'ITHz IELAIONsln, OF STATE FUNDS AND CwIrT TO PRIVATE ILNTER'RISE
The important constitutional restriction here is Article IX, Section 10,

which states that:
The credit of the state shall not be pledged or loaned to any
individual, company, corporation, or association; nor shall the State
beconie a joint owner or stockholder in any company . . . . The
Legislature shall not authorize any county, city . . . to become
[such] a stockholder . . . or to obtain or appropriate money for,

or to loan the credit to, any corporation, association, institution
or individual.
This restriction received surprising judicial activity recently. In State
v. Escambia County,287 the county issued certificates of indebtedness to
pay for the development, into a general recreational-resort area, of certain
beaches owned by the county. The county had legislative authority to
281. State v. Dade County, 54 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1951).
282. 62 So.2d 708 (,la. 195;).
283. Id. at 711. There is a great deal of discretion, constitutionality, in local
officialdom; Ryan v. State, 60 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1952) (redistricting of a county).
284. State v. Florida State Improvement Commission, 60 So.2d 747, 750 (Fla. 1952).
285. See note 258 supra.
286. See note 284 supra, at page 759.
287. 52 So.2d 125 (la. 1951).
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purchase or construct by itself or with private enterprise by contract or
lease facilities running from harbors to hotels and store buildings. The
certificates were to be paid for by revenues from operating the project.
The decision validating this project is reasonable under the constitutional
language. However, in the 1952 case of State v. Town of North Miami -'8
the court invalidated a similar project under the same constitutional
language. There the town desired to issue similar certificates to purchase
land and to construct thereon an aluminum manufacturing plant. A
private corporation was to lease the project for 20 years, the rent monies
paying for the certificates. The difference seems to be that use of public
funds to develop, for private enterprise, an entire resort is for a "public
purpose," 2 90 while such usage to lure manufacturers to an area is not.
Since the court read the words "public purpose" into the constitutional
language this result was not necessary. The restrictive language of the
decision was also far too broad to bear close scrutiny. -.11o However, this
decision is easier to justify than the 1952 Daytona Bleach case -"" wherein
the city, tnder proper legislative authority, undertook to redevelop a blighted
area by acquiring the land by purchase or eminent domain with the
ultimate purpose of re-zoning the area and making it available for sale
or lease to private enterprise. The North Miami case was cited as
controlling authority. The differences are startling. In the present case,
particularly, the entrance of the police power of the city should be possible
since the area to be redeveloped was "blighted." The only possible
distinction, under the restrictive constitutional phrases, from State v.
Escambia County was the fact that there the county already owned the
land. A petty distinction? In both cases the police power could be
referred to-blighted areas and undeveloped areas both need government
planning on a long-range basis.21a- Since the constitutional language does
not require the court's conclusion, that conclusion apparently mirrors the
court's distaste for the particular governmental attempted project. 93 The
original constitutional intent probably was limited to "counter debauching
the state's credit and the reckless speculation" involved therein.'288. 59 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
289. See note 287 supra, at page 129.

290. See note 288 supra, at page 786.
291. Adam v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 60 So.2d 663 (h7a. 1952).
292. A similar case was State v. Nhiamli, 62 So.2d 404 (11a. 1953), wherein the
local government issued debt certificates to pay for the construction of a large building
for the leased usage of National Airlines, the certificates to be paid for from the project's
rental.
293. There were 2 other cases tunder 1,hu.. Czs'r. Art. IX, § 10. Brautigan v.
White, 64 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1953), validated a county's attempt to purchase an
incorporated country club by purchasing the inember ownership certificates. Overman
v. State Board of Control, 62 So.2d 696 (FIa. 1952), validated a state subsidy to a
non-profit educational institution such as the University of Miami.
294. Brautigan v. White, 64 So.2d 781, 784 (Fla. 1953).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
LEsLArON AND TIlE CoNsrrruTION

There are several provisions in the Florida Constitulion which require
a certain awareness on the part of the legislature in the mundane business
of mechanics of the legislative process -'D or the equally mundane problems
of constitutional draftingY
The recent cases interpreting these provisions
T
are not particularly notable.2
I. Article II, Section 16
This section states that "Each law enacted in the Legislature shall
embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which
subject shall be briefly expressed in the title; and no law shall be amended
or revised by reference to its title only .... ." rhere were several cases, in
the last two years, interpreting these words.
Miami v. Iladley 98 dealt with the possibly deliberate deceptive
practice problem. There, the title to one act indicated a repeal of
several provisions of the city charter, while the title to another act
purportedly added material to the charter. In fact the first act preserved
practically everything the title stated repealed while the second failed
to add anything. rhe whole attempt-a "fragmentary approach to . . .
amendment which was deceptive"-was invalidated. A similar act was
invalidated by the court," which repealed an earlier act, which in the
body of the repealing act contained a provision partially restricting the
effect of the repeal. The title of the former act failed to mention
this provision.
The case most generally involved with this constitutional restriction
dealt with notice. Would "a trustee of the internal improvement fund
who read the title not be advised that the property of the state under
his charge was being conveyed by the legislature" was a typical issue
here.300 The test of the court was whether the title would "reasonably
.. . give notice of what one may expect to find in the body of the act."
The court's solution was that, "Tucked away in the body of the act is
a grant of sovereign lands." The title indicated little more than abolishment
City of Ocoee v. BownesS 0 2
and recreation of a city government.301
was more descriptive of the meaning of the constitutional words. Only
295. E.g., FLA. CoNs'r. Art. I11, § 17 (1951)

its title ,..."),
296. E.g.,
subject . . .").

FA. CONST. Art.

1Il, § 16 (1951)

("Evcry bill shall be read by

("Each law ... shall embrace but one

297. See, generally, Manson, The Drafting of Statute Titles, 10 IND. L.J. 155 (1934)
and Cloc and Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24 Ky. L.. 351 (1936).
298. 61 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1952).
299. Soule v. Lewis, 66 So.2d 665 (FIa. 1953).
300. Bird Key Corp. v. Sarasota, 54 So.2d 245, 247 (Fla. 1951).
301. Thompson v. Intereounty Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1952) was
handled the same way. The court insisted that those affected by the act have a
reasonable notice from the title language. On the facts the decision is excellent.
302. 65 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1953).
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the "subject" of the act need be expressed, not the "objct"-"reasonable
notice" of the "scope of the act" is necessary. 'h title need not be
an "index to its contents." A strong presumption has to be overcome to
invalidate; the title must be "deceptive" as well as "unartificial as an
expression of the subject matter." It is possible that strong prayer may
assist a draftor under these phrases.
The court also held that, "Where a statute is re-enacted in a general
revision of the laws, an original imperfection in title is cured by such
re-enactment.'' 93111 This had to do with amending by reference to title
only. A legislative curing of a title defect by amending was held not
retroactive in effect. :"" "Plurality.of subject" was not accomplished where
the "subjects" were not "discordant.'' 309
II. Article 11I,

Section 20

This section states that the "Legislature shall not pass special or
local laws in any of the following enumerated cases: that is to say, regulating
the jurisdiction and duties of any class of officers ... regulating the practice
of courts .... ." In the case of In re Rouse 06 a juvenile court was established
by a population act applicable to counties having a population of over
350,000 persons. The court indicated that such acts arc valid when the
"purpose" of the act has a "fair relation" to the population requirement.
This act was validated since Dade County, the only county presently
affected, had such a large dependent child problem in connection with
the numerous divorce cases tried there. Also the court stated that the
general problem of children and courts is different in these larger urban
areas.307 A similar case3 0 8 involved an act, applicable to counties of over
315,000 population, which increased membership in the grand jury to 23
jurors. The same test was used. Since large counties have more crime
than small counties and the juries sit almost continuously therein the
court stated large juries would function there more expeditiously since
the quorum nembers can be rotated.
Under the court's test of reasonable classification of population acts
several of such acts were rightfully invalidated. In one case Pinellas
County was arbitrarily excluded from the operation of the general budget
commission laws;309 in another, Escambia County voters were given a choice
303. Rodriguez v. Jones, 64 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1953).
304. See note 301 sura.

305. Hanson v. State, 56 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1952) (an act abolished one court

and transferred the jurisdiction to another court).
306. 66 Sn.2d 42, 44 (Fla. 1953).
307. See VIRTUE, SURVFY oF NIETROPOLITAN COURTS DTROrr AREA (1950).
Justice Mathew's dissent arguled that the child's welfare was the same in all counties
and anyway the act simply lessened the work of ten circuit judges and increased the
work of one juvenile court judge. Therefore, the classification was not reasonable.
308. Lightfoot v. State, 64 So.2d 261 (Ila. 1953).
309. Budget Commission of Pinellas County v. Blocker, 60 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1952).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
to retain a budget commission.3' 0 One questionable decision""1 permitted
a city charter provision to the effect that no personal injury suit could
l)e started against the city without notice within 60 days of the injury.
Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent,3 12 pointed out that one of the purposes
of the constitutional statement was to obtain uniformity in court practice.
In an earlier decision the court had invalidated a quite similar charter
provision. 3s

Ill. Article llI, Section 2I314
InLindsay v. Miani 31 5 an act which applied to cities,
with over 315,000 population, prohibited women bartenders.
classification test was used. The court probably rightfully
women's morals are common to all size counties. Also, a
large county could impose the restriction. This made the

within counties
The reasonable
concluded that
small city in a
act's populaton

classification purely arbitrary.
IV. Conclusion

'lhe activity of the court under sections 20 and 21 of Article II is

important to the draftor of legislation only as indicative of the attitude of
the court toward those constitutional words. Simply put, if the court is
emphasizing, for example, notice in titles, draftors must be more careful.
It is difficult to cite one case in this constitutional area to mean much
with reference to another case-what is a "reasonable classification" or
single "subject" changes act by act.
CONCLUSION

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, for this writer to resist the temptation
of a few concluding remarks upon the health of Florida constitutional law
during the survey years.
Bluntly, that legal scene is ailing and a diagnosis defies simplicity.

Since this characterization of the situation would amply describe much
of Florida law, in general, more must be attempted-and it is possible to

localize several causation factors. An incredibly over-worked state supreme
310. Soule v. Lewis, 66 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1953).
311. Oliver v. St. Petersburg, 65 So.2d 71 (Fla. 1953).
312. Id.at 75-76.
313. Skinner v. Eustis, 147 Fla. 22, 2 So.2d 116 (1941) (suits can be commenced
within 6 months).
314. "Inall cases enumerated inthe preceding Section, alllaws shall he general ...
but in all cases, not enumerate . . . the Legislature may pass special or local laws . . .

PROVIDED that no local . . .bill shall be passed, nor shall any local or special law
establishing or abolishing municipalities, or providing for their government . . . be
passed, unless notice of intention . . . shall have been published

315. 32 So.2d Ill (Fla. 1951).

. .
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court explains much of the inadequacy. Maintenance of enlarged judicial
reviewing practices by tile court, when elsewhere such judicial power properly
dwindles, provides a partial explanation. Perhaps the entirety is reached
by reflection ol the antique, poorly draftcd, and just as poorly amended
state constitution. Only slight exploration of these is feasible here. The
heavy time burden under which the court struggles undoubtedly parallels
the analytical nightmare in Florida constitutional law-a nightmare which
only thoughtful analysis can dissipate. The decisions, at times, have ignored
Federal Constitutional issues,3 a or so failed to differentiate between such
issues and the state constitutional law that the actual basis for decision
Statements, unnecessary to decision,
is impossible to determine.?"
impregnate the cases.' 8 A Florida judiciary favorite is the shotgun
approach to constitutional law-a number of constitutional grounds being
urged by the court for invalidation purposes. : '" This approach is particularly
deadly to the reach of legislative power in the state. Another untidy
practice has been a comingling of statute and constitutional law to the
extent that analysis is impossiblc.Y20 Othcr decisions have not been
specifically related to a particularclausc in the constitution. 2 ' Thc mcaning
of such decisions always remains unclcar. It might be suggested that the
Florida Supreme Court simply write fewer decisions. This not a brilliant
nor original suggestion, yet under it quantity, not quality, undoubtedly
would suffer. 22- There are other, less obvious, suggestions..3 23
Judicial self-restraint is difficult to over-emphasize in constitutional law.
Constitutional revolutions have recently taken place which have successfully
breached an over-powering wall of judicial supremacy.2 -" The hard won
presumptions of legislative correctness are of extreme necessity, since so
much of constitutional law is purely a subjective area directly reflecting
316. E.g., Lightfoot v. State. 64 So.2d 261, 265 (Nla. 1953) (on re-hearing). The
court presents the issue and ignores it.
317. E.g., Siteed v. Mayo, 66 So.2d 865 (Fli. 1953).
318. E.g., Lee v. Delmar, 66 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1953).
319. E.g., State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
320. E.g., Owens v. State, 61 So.2d 412, 416 (Fla. 1952). See also Boynton v.
State, 64 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1953), wherein the court vaguely mixed due process and search
and seizure.
321. E.g., Miami v. lenson, 63 So.2d 916 (Ma. 19;1).

322. Why make it easy for those who insist that the present appellate process
is really adequate-no intermediate appellate court system of revision of ouir iresent

system seems necessary.
323. The court has a reverence for the Amrican Jurisprudcue work (and like
publications) which is unfortttnatc-thcse are not particularly brilliant sources for

constitutional law.

'he court apparently relied heavily on such works in many cases.

E.g., Slate v. Cootner, 60 So,2d 734 (Fla. 1952): ,rav v. State, 54 So.2d 436 (Fla. 1952);

Chase v. City of Sanford, 54 So.2d 370 (Vla. 1951); Mayo v.Lukers, 53 So.2d 916
(Fla. 1951).

The court cited these works many, many liuses.

E.g., Miami v. Romer,

58 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1952); Hanson v. State, 56 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1952); Nlaiers v.Peters,
52 So.2d 793 (Fla. 1951).
324. See, generally, CoawiN, CON SruUTONAL REVOLUTiON, LTD. (1941).
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the judges' personality and background. " 52 In a modern state the police
power, restricted to health, safety and morals, is a poor thing. The
administrative process limited by pass4 separation and delegation of power
arguments crumbles before modern problems.32 The possibility of yet
other constitutional revolutions-filtering from the federal to the statesmay soon be realized .32 T Contraction of Florida judicial power will facilitate
entrance thereof on the Florida legal stage.
These concerns the Florida Supreme Court rapidly can correct.
Fairness compels, however, the admission that an ultimate, other than
partial, solution to Florida constitutional ills undoubtedly necessitates a
28
modern constitution.

326. Unsympathetic

judicial treatment

wrecks the administrative

course, the lack of a state administrative procedure act helps.

process.

Of

327. See the review on Crosskey's great book, )uHAM,
CRossKNY ON 'rile
An Essay-Review, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 209 (1953), CaossKEv, POLITICS
TilE CONSTITUTION IN THE
lISTORY OF THE UNITrD SIARES (1953)
is "must"
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AND

reading for those interested in American constitutional law; reviews thereon are
nunerous and conflicting.
328. Recent constitutional problems demonstrate this. See Miami Herald, Dec. 12,
1953, p. 1, col. 7, for a discouraging example.
325. Are citations necessary? Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional
Law, 57 YALE L.J. 550 (1948).

